Hillel and Ezra - Shabbos 153b

הלל ועזרא

Hillel and Ezra

Shabbos 153b

The Gemara here cites the dispute between R’ Yehoshua and R’ Eliezer as to whether the episode in which Beis Shammai overwhelmed Beis Hillel and issued eighteen new decrees was a good thing or a bad thing (see the description of the even earlier in the mesechta, 17b).

Hillel, the first of the Sages of the Mishnah, was eulogized as a student of Ezra HaSofer (Sanhedrin 11a). Indeed, both Sages ascended from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael and renewed interest and involvement in Torah.

R’ Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Takanas HaShavin #5) notes that it would seem that they were of very different bents. Ezra and the Anshei Knesses HaGedolah were very much involved in instituting seyagim and takkanos - boundary prohibitions surrounding Torah law, and enactments meant to promote greater observance (see the beginning of Pirkei Avos), while Hillel and his students opposed the institution of newer and greater strictures in Halachah (see Tosafos to 14b d.h. V’Ilu and here d.h. Bo Bayom. This was in line with Hillel’s general trend towards leniency. How, then was Hillel a student of Ezra?

Reb Tzadok resolves the difficulty. He notes that, clearly, Hillel was not literally a student of Ezra, who lived many years before him. Rather, he followed in Ezra’s footsteps in that he was humble and pious (as the Gemara in Sanhedrin frames the eulogy: הי עניו הי חסיד ). However, in the generation of Ezra, humility and piety required more seyagim and takkanos. This was essential for the success and maintenance of that generation’s teshuvah, which was not complete. Since they did not achieve full teshuvah, there prior sins were not reversed, and new enactments had to be introduced in order to prevent backsliding.

In Hillel’s time, however, the great love he displayed towards others (see Pirkei Avos 1:12) influenced them to turn with love towards Hashem. Teshuvah done out of love is complete teshivah. In such circumstances, Chazal tell us that the sinner’s pasts transgressions metamorphose and become merits. Hence, those sins would not lead to backsliding - as they themselves have been changed into mitzvos. Therefore, new enactments and boundaries were not necessary.

The Wheel of Poverty - Shabbos 151b

הגלגל החוזר

The Wheel of Poverty

Shabbos 151b

The Gemara relates that R’ Chiya told his wife that if and when a poor person comes to their door, she should immediately bring him bread to eat — even before they had a chance to make requests. R’ Chiya explained to her that in reward for her diligence in this matter, other people would immediately bring their children bread, when the children became impoverished. R’ Chiya’s wife was astonished, and she responded to here husband: “Are you cursing me?” To which R’ Chiya replied that the reality is that poverty is like a wheel that rolls around the world, and would therefore inevitably affect their descendants at some time (see Yevamos 63a for something about the state of the relationship of R’ Chiya and his wife).

On the basis of this discussion, the Vilna Gaon (see Pninim MeShulchan HaGra to Ki Sisa 30:12) explained the trop (cantillation) on the word ונתנו — and they shall give — in the phrase: כִּי תִשָּׂא אֶת־רֹאשׁ
בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לִפְקֻֽדֵיהֶם וְנָתְנוּ אִישׁ כֹּפֶר נַפְשׁוֹ לַֽיהוָֹה בִּפְקֹד אֹתָם — If you uplift the heads of the Jews according to their count, and they shall give, each person, the redemption of his soul to Hashem when they are counted. The trop is a kadma v’azla.

This trop is placed specifically on ונתנו , as this word is a palindrome - a word that reads the same forwards and backwards. This word comes to indicate that sometimes the giver or his children will be compelled to accept charity from the person to whom they once gave tzedakah themselves.

The allusion in the trop is in the literal meanings of kadma v’azla — “goes in early and then goes forth.” Thus, R’ Chiya told his wife something along these lines: “Give the poor person the bread as soon as possible, so that the merit will go forth and provide for your children.”

[See Baal HaTurim ad loc. who also notes the palindrome, but explains that it comes to teach us that if a person gives to tzedakah, he will receive the money back in some manner, and thus, in the final analysis, he does not suffer financially from giving itzedakah.

Thinking About Weekday Matters on Shabbos -

הרהור בעניני חול בשבת

Thinking About Weekday Matters on Shabbos

Shabbos 150b

Although the Gemara (150a) rules that it is permitted to think of weekday matters on Shabbos, it subsequently (150b) cites the episode of a certain very pious individual who found himself thinking of his weekday matters on Shabbos and felt that he had violated the sanctity of Shabbos by doing so.

Reb Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Yisrael Kedoshim #8) writes that when we thank Hashem in the Minchah of Shabbos for providing us with the potential to achieve a מנוחת אמת ואמונה — a rest of truth and belief — we are referring to our potential to attain the level of that very pious individual. For the ideal Menuchas Shabbos in which even in the depth of our hearts we regard all weekday matters as having been completed and no longer requiring our attention. It does not suffice for us to do the minimum, to refrain from forbidden activities yet at the same time allow our hearts to continue being distracted by our commerce and craft.

Only such a state can rightly be termed a Menuchas Emes, for truth is that which penetrates to our greatest depths and remains consistent. A “truth” that only “holds true” on a superificial level (refraining from expressing concern over weekday matters, yet at the same time considering, these matters in our mind) cannot be called “true.” Such superficial truth might fool other people, but not Hashem, concerning whom it is said שחותמו אמת — his seal is truth.

Thus, while refraining from mundane conversation is a technical fulfillment of the command to desist from expressing oneself in weekday matters, it is not a Menuchah Sheleimah (a truly complete, befiting rest).

Hence, concludes Reb Tzadok, those who are in awe of G-d because they are cognizant of Hashem’s knowledge of that which is concealed deep in one’s heart are extremely meticulous and vigilant in barring any weekday thoughts from their minds.

Turning to False Gods - Shabbos 149a

פניה לאלילים

Turning to False Gods

Shabbos 149a

The Gemara here states that one may not gaze at images even on a weekday, as this is a violation of the Torah’s prohibition (Vayikra 19:4): אל תפנו אל האלילים — Do not turn to false gods. The Gemara explains that gazing at images is subsumed under this prohibition because the phrase may be read: אל תפנו אל מדעתכם — Do not turn to that which you create from your own thoughts.

Ramban (to Vayikra loc. cit.) explains the prohibition further, and states that it warns us not to belief that other deities can provide us with any benefit, nor to believe predictions that the prophets of these deities foretell. Rather, you must realize that the future is dictated by Hashem alome, and the other gods and all that is attributed to them must be null and void in your eyes. It is in this context, continues Ramban, that the Gemara asks us to avoid gazing at representations of other deities, as a person should avoid focusing his attention on any deity other than Hashem.

In the same vein, Shem MiShmuel (Parashas Veyeileich, 5672) writes that the statement (Devarim 31:18): וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא עַל כָּל הָרָעָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כִּי פָנָה אֶל אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים — And I will surely conceal My countenance on that day on account of all the evil that he did, for he turned to other gods — does not refer to pantheistic or pagan worhsip. Rather, it refers to a person who did not sanctify himself sufficiently — to a person who was not meticulous in refraining from gazing at the images of other deities. In this manner Shem MeShmuel resolves the difficulty presented by the pesukim in Parashas Vayeileich: If the Jews have already done teshuvah, as indicated by the previous pesukim, why does Hashem continuee to conceal himself?

The answer is that they did teshuvah on the major sins, and that suffices to save them from perishing in Galus, but they did not turn away from the images of the countenances of other gods. Hence, measure for measure, Hashem conceals His countenance from them.

Shem MeShmuel concludes: וזה לימוד גדול לאדם לידע שבימי התשובה העיקר לקבל על עצמו להיות מקדש עצמו במותר לו מהיום והלאה וידאב לבו על העבר ולא תהי' די לו הקבלה על גופי המצוות, וישכיל וידע עד היכן הדברים מגיעים — And this is a great lesson, to know that in the days of teshuvah, the main thing is to accept upon oneself to refrain even from that which is [technically] permitted [such as gazing at images] from today onwards, and his heart should regret the past. For it does not suffice to accept resolutions on the mitzvos themselves. And a person should consider and know to what extent these matters [of teshuvah] reach.

Terms of Borrowing Objects and Terms of Borrowing Money - Shabbos 148a

זמן שאלה וזמן הלואה

Terms of Borrowing Objects and Terms of Borrowing Money

Shabbos 148a

The Mishnah states that a person may borrow jugs of wine or oil from his friend on Shabbos, so long as the term he uses to describe the transaction is the case-specific term for borrowing objects ( שאלה — lit., request) and not the term generally used to describe the borrowing of money ( הלואה — lit., loan). Rashi explains that this is because a loan is generally for thirty days (see Makkos 3b), which is a longer period of time than the period of time of a normal request. We are therefore concerned that the person who is lending the jug will want to record this unusual transaction, and may come to write on Shabbos.

Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafos rejects Rashi’s explanation. He notes that the Gemara (Menachos 44a) rules that a talis that one borrows for up to thirty days is defined as a טלית שאולה — a talis on request — is therefore exempt from tzitzis; and that a house (outside the Land of Israel) that one rents or otherwise uses has the status of a request for thirty days and is therefore exempt from mezuzah. Rabbeinu Tam explains that the exemption is clearly because everyone knows that an object or house may be the subject of a request for up to thirty days. The obligation to tie tzitzis or to fix a mezuzah after the thirty days is because the arrangement no longer looks like a request, but like an acquisition. Tosafos go on to record Ri’s explanation of our Mishnah’s ruling, which differs from Rashi.

Ramban, (to Makkos loc. cit.) however, rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s proof. He notes that, clearly, [even according to Rabbeinu Tam] the distinction between within the thirty days and after the thirty days is only in the eyes of the beholder ( מראית העין ), as a request, and even a loan, may be contracted for a longer period. It is only because people begin to perceive the tallis or house as the borrower’s or the renter’s that Chazal imposed the obligation of tzitzis or mezuzah respectively. But this has everthing to do with perception, and nothing to do with the terms of the transaction. It is entirely possible that although a loan may not be demanded back by the lender before thirty days have elpased, a request may be demanded back by its owner well within those thirty days. It is only after thirty days have elapsed, however, that people begin to regard the ownership of the object or the house as having shifted to the borrower.

The Definition of the Prohibition of Cleaning on Shabbos - Shabbos 147a

הגדרת מלבן

The Definition of the Prohibition of Cleaning on Shabbos

Shabbos 147a

The Gemara cites Rav Huna’s ruling that a person who shakes out a garment on Shabbos is liable to bring a chatas (sin-offeing) — i.e., he violates a Torah prohibition. Rashi explains that the case is one in which a person is shaking dust off his garment, and that he is liable to bring a chatas because the shaking-out cleans the garment, thus violating the Torah prohibition of melaben (“whitening”).

R’ Akiva Eiger (Derush V’Chiddush to Shabbos 134b) notes that Rashi evidently contradicts himself. The Gemara there cites Rav Kahana’s ruling that a person who has mud on the outside of his garment is permitted to rub the inside of the garment so that the mud may flake off. Rashi there explains that rubbing on the inside is permitted because it does not resemble cleaning (since the mud is not being rubbed off directly). Rashi adds that in any event the rubbing there is not a Torah violation of melaben, since there is no water involved.

Thus, on the one hand, Rashi to 147a indicates that even when no water is involved a Torah prohibition of melaben may be violated, while on the other hand, Rashi to 134b indicates that a Torah prohibtion is only violated when water is involved.

R’ Akiva Eiger does not offer a resolution to the contradiction. Bigdei Shesh, however, suggests a resolution: The Gemara here, 147a, is discussing a garment soiled by dust, while the Gemara there, 134b, is discussing a garment soiled by mud. It is not necessary to use water to rid a garment of dust, but in order to cleanse a garment of mud, one really needs to use water. Hence, it is readily understood that in regard to dust, shaking out is an adequate manner of cleansing, and thus a Torah violation, while in regard to mud, rubbing without water is not an adequate manner of cleansing, and therefore not a Torah violation.

Destructive Activities for the Purpose of Shabbos - Shabbos 146a

מקלקל לצורך שבת

Destructive Activities for the Purpose of Shabbos

Shabbos 146a

The mishnah here states that a person may break a jug on Shabbos in order to eat the dates that it contains. By way of explaining this ruling, Rashi writes that destructive activity (viz., breaking the jug) on Shabbos is not prohibited at all. The Rishonim find this assertion difficult, as it seems from several sugyos that there is a rabbinic prohibition even on destructive activities. They therefore write that the rationale underlying this mishnah’s ruling is that it is only for the purpose of Shabbos ( לצורך שבת — in this case, the eating of dates) that destructive activity is permitted (see Rashba and Ran). Other Rishonim suggest that the jug in question here is of a special type: a mustiki - a jar that had previously been broken and then glued together again, and that it is because it is a “disposable” container that it may be broken (see Tosafos and Rosh).

Afikei Yam (vol. 2, 4:6) suggests that Rashi’s position is that Chazal only forbade destructive activity when its constructive analog would constitute a Torah prohibition ( מלאכה גמורה מה"ת ). The constructive analog of the destruction of a jug by breaking it would be breaking the jug in order to make it more useful (for example, if a jug is sealed with a plug, and cannot be uses, breaking off the plug would be constructive breakage). However, in order to violate a Torah prohibition one must break something in order to build something else in its place ( סותר על מנת לבנות ), not in order to improve the existing item. Hence, in our case, in which the breaking has no constructive analog, Chazal allowed the activity. Afikei Yam further notes that according to Rashi, in a case such as ours, which involves breaking vessels, even breaking the vessel in order to build something else in its place would be permitted, as Rashi’s position elsewhere is that there is never any Torah prohibition involved in the construction or destruction of vessels of any sort ( אין בנין וסתירה בכלים ). [Afikei Yam cites several other authorities that seem to be of the same opinion, among them Sefer Yereim, mitzvah #272.]

Zemiros Translation

A talmid of Ohr Somayach who is B"H getting married soon asked me to tranlate my zemiros so he can include them and their translations in his chausnah bentcher. So here are the translations to the texts:

The Night Zemer:

You destined us, Your nation, Your name to glorify,

You commanded your holy people, the world to illuminate,

And a day akin to [the World] to Come, You granted to us,

A special gift, because You chose us.

The sum of six days, we are mired in toils,

The [ultimate] purpose is concealed, by pursuits of livelihood,

When, however, the footfalls of Friday are overheard,

Again to be uplifted, we yearn.

[Then] comes the lighting of candles, leaving day-to-day,

We enter the "field of sacred apples,"

In the mornings, to "the ancient," in the afternoons to "the miniature countenance,"

Remember us and we will recall You, purify mundane life.

See into our hearts, King of Kings,

Our will [is to do] Your will, Sustainer of the worlds,

Our yearnings should be accepted, One who discerns the inner [workings],

Hear our requests, fill us with holiness.

Please cause to flow down to us, our additional souls,

[Our] portions grant us to taste, in Your supernal rest,

To love and to hold in awe, purify our hearts,

Educate us, refine us.

One more request we shall ask of You, From on High send us Light,

The precious [light], from Genesis hidden, the quality of "Remember" and Keep,"

Fulfill the requests of our hearts, in absolute truth,

To unify You unify us, speed us the redemption.


The Day Zemer:

Note: Much of this Zemer consists of allusions to the Aggadata concerning the Giving of the Torah in Perek Amar R' Akiva in Meseches Shabbos.

Creation was afraid, that He would return it to desolation, for on the sixth day He set a condition,

The Bride preceded "We shall do" to "We shall hear," on Shabbos it [Creation] was perfected, found rest.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

And at the moment they accepted [the Torah], angels hastened, and tied two crowns on everyone,

When they sinned, they relinquished their decorations, [but] on Shabbos Moshe adorns us with them.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

"Stink" was not written, [as a sign of] endearment to us, the [previously] hidden treasure he left in out hands,

Those whose path is to the left, their spirit shall expire, [but] for those who turn to the right it is an elixir of life.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

The mouths of the seraphim, denigrated [Moshe] born of woman, he who ascended on High [Moshe] responded with words:

To those who perform crafts, is the task [of] Resting [on Shabbos], [with] Shabbos we shall come and rectify the world.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

The revelation of the secrets of the canopy, the giving of the law, is found in the chapter of the broker of Torah [R' Akiva],

The kingship of Torah, a heritage to [any] one who takes it, today shall delight us in its abundance of light.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

The roots of the Rest, likened to the World to the Come, uplifted a nation above free will,

The sign of the Rest, and the light of the Torah, will testify to the sanctity of the cherished nation.

The day that Creation attained its purpose, on Shabbos the Torah was given!

Fascinating Thunderstorm Minhag!

ספר הברית - חלק א מאמר י מקריות מוסדות תבל - פרק יד
ודע בני כי היראה מן הברק ורעם טובה לאדם ורפואת הנפש כי יראת אלהים תוסיף ימים והאלהים עשה שייראו מלפניו. יש נוהגים לפתוח חומש פרשת עשרת הדברות בסדר יתרו בעת הברק והרעם ואין לשחוק עליהם במנהג זה, כי הטעם הוא בעבור כי שם נאמר ויהי קולות וברקים (שמות י"ט) כלומר זכות אותן הקולות והברקים של מתן תורה אשר קבלנו מגין עלינו מן הקולות והברקים האלה המסוכנים, ושם נאמר גם כן אל תיראו כי לבעבור נסות אתכם בא האלהים, ובעבור תהיה יראתו על פניכם לבלתי תחטאו:

Moving Bones on Shabbos - Shabbos 143a

טלטול עצמות בשבת

Moving Bones on Shabbos

Shabbos 143a

The mishnah states that according to Beis Shammai you may use your hands to pick up and remove bones and shells from a table on Shabbos, while according to Beis Hillel you may not pick up the bones and shells with your hands. Rather, you must lift up the table top and spill the refuse off of it without coming into direct contact with the bones and shells. Rav Nachman in the Gemara reverses the opinions, attributing the lenient opinion to Beis Hillel and the stringent opinion to Beis Shammai.

Rashi (d.h. Atzamos) explains that the bones under discussion in the mishnah are “hard, that are not suitable for a dog.” Tosafos (d.h. Atzamos) reject Rashi’s interpretation. They assert (and cite proof) that you may only use your hands to pick up bones if they are suitable for an animal to consume.

Nachalas Yaakov (to Beitzah 2a, Tosafos d.h. Magbihin) sustains Rashi’s interpretation. He does so on the basis of Darchei Moshe (Orach Chaim 308:10), who writes that you may move refuse — viz., bones and shells — that is suitable for animals that are in your home on Shabbos, even if the refuse became separated from the food before Shabbos began. On the other hand, you may not move refuse that is only suitable for dogs who are to be found in the marketplace (not in your home) unless it became separated from the food on Shabbos itself. (Nachalas Yaakov suggests that the rationale of the latter ruling is that anything that was categorized as food for a part of Shabbos — viz., the bones and shells while still adhering to the meat or the nut — retains its categorization as food so long as it is still suitable for a dog.)

Nachalas Yaakov explains that the distinction made by Darchei Moshe underlies our mishnah’s structure, in which bones and shells are discussed separately from the pods of legumes. The separation indicates an essential difference: The bones and shells under discussion are only suitable for large dogs, and generally large dogs are not present in a home. Hence, in order to permit carrying these bones and shells in one’s hands, they must have been separated from the food on Shabbos itself. Pods, on the other hand, are suitable even for the small animals that are generally present in the home. Hence, they may be carried by hand even if they had become separated from their food before Shabbos began.

Taking Darchei Moshe’s distinction further, Nachalas Yaakov suggests that when Rashi writes that these bones are hard and not suitable for a dog, he means that they are the type of bones that are not suitable for the small dogs that are generally present in the home. They are suitable, however, for the large dogs one finds in the marketplace. Thus, our mishnah reflects Darchei Moshe’s latter ruling.

Adam Chashuv - Shabbos 142b

אדם חשוב

A Distinguished Person

Shabbos 142b

The Gemara (Shabbos 142b) relates that although Abaye was of the opinion that it is permitted to carry sheaves of harvested grain on Shabbos, he nevertheless refrained from doing so unless he first placed a ladle on the sheave.

Why did he hold it is permitted to carry sheaves? Although the grain they contain must undergo much processing before it is edible, the stalks of which the sheaves are comprised can serve here and now as mats upon which a person may lay down.

Why then did he refrain from doing so? Because he was a distinguished person. Hence, his conduct would serve as a model that other people might emulate. Therefore, lest other people draw erroneous conclusions and potentially treat prohibitions leniently, Abaye conducted himself stringently and refrained from carrying the sheaves outright.

The Gemara then cites Rava’s similar conduct in another case involving the laws of Shabbos.

On the basis of this passage and other, similar Gemaras, Yad Malachi (Klalei ha’Alef #6) rejects the assertion of Be’er Sheva (fol. 110d) that it is only in regard to the law that forbids dishes cooked by non-Jews (Bishul Akum) that a distinguished person must maintain a higher standard (Be’er Sheva contends that this is due to the unique distance from “non-kosher” food that is the essence of this prohibition.) Indeed, in his notes to Yad Malachi (ad loc.), R’ Yeshaya Pick notes that he found fourteen laws besides the law of Bishul Akum in which the principle that a distinguished person should maintain a higher standard is invoked.

Hence, writes Yad Malachi, a scholar must refrain from activities — that are perfectly permissible for other people — when they touch upon any area of Halacha in which a prohibition may apply. He explains that this is because of a fact of human nature expounded by Talmud Yerushalmi in Moed Kattan (cited by Ritva to Moed Kattan 2a), that people is are more likely to interpret what they see erroneously and draw distorted conclusions than to intepret what they see correctly and draw accurate conclusion.

Treatment of the Dying - Shabbos 151b

Treatment of the Dying - Shabbos 151b

מסכת שבת דף קנ " א ע " ב :

משנה : אין מעצמין את המת בשבת ולא בחול עם יציאת נפש והמעצים עם יציאת הנפש הרי זה שופך דמים . גמרא : תנו רבנן המעצמו עם יציאת הנפש הרי זה שופך דמים משל לנר שכבה והולכת אדם מניח אצבעו עליה מיד כבתה .

Mishnah: The eyes of the dead may not be closed on Shabbos, nor on a weekday as the soul expires, and a person who closes the eyes as the soul expires is a killer. Gemara: The Rabbis taught in a Baraisa: A person who closes another’s [eyes] as the soul expires is a killer. This is analogous to the flame of a candle that is going out — if a person puts his finger on it, it goes out immediately.

In Meseches Semachos¹ the Baraisa adds that a person who even touches a dying person is a killer. There are, however, circumstances in which a dying person may be touched. For example, if a fire breaks out in the house in which the person is dying, it is permitted to remove him from the house.² In the same vein a physician may touch the dying person in order to treat him, so long as there is even the most remote hope that the patient’s life might be extended. Only once the patient is beyond hope, does it become forbidden to touch him. At that point, it is forbidden even to perform the most routine procedures on him, such as checking blood pressure or temperature, or even checking his pulse.³

However, while it is forbidden to shorten the life of a dying person, even by a few moments, it is not necessary to make heroic efforts to prolong life either. In this respect, Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach⁴ distinguishes between treatments that meet a patient’s basic natural needs, or that are customary and routine, and treatments that do not meet natural needs and that are not routine.

For example, it is forbidden to deprive the dying patient of oxygen, food or intravenous nutrition. If the patient suffers from diabetes he may not be deprived of insulin. If he is being transfused, he may not be deprived of blood. If he is on a course of antibiotics, it may not be stopped. Yet, there is no obligation to actively treat the patient if the treatment if it will prolong (and certainly if it will cause) suffering and not heal his illness — especially if the patient himself does not want to be treated.

If the dying patient has ceased breathing or his heart has stopped beating, there is no obligation to resuscitate him or attempt to restart his heart.⁵

Reb Shlomo Zalman also rules that it is permissible to administer morphine and other pain medication to a dying patient, even though the medication may itself kill him or hasten his death. The only restriction that Reb Shlomo Zalman imposes is that no single injection that will inevitably in itself hasten the patient’s death may be administered. It is only permissible to administer the medication in a manner that over time will take its toll. For example, a patient who has difficulty breathing may not be given morphine when it is likely that the morphine will arrest his breathing altogether — as this would be the equivalent of our case of closing the eyes of a dying man — unless the patient is respirated artificially.⁶

1.

מסכת אבל רבתי פרק א' דין ד': אין מעמצין את עיני הגוסס הנוגע בו ומזיזו הרי זה שופך דמים שהיה רבי מאיר אומר משל לנר שהוא מטפטף כיון שנגע בו אדם מכבהו כך כל המעמץ את עיני הגוסס מעלין עליו כאילו הוא נוטל נשמתו.

2.

חידושי הגרעק"א ליו"ד סי' של"ט סעיף א'.

3.

נשמת אברהם ליו"ד שם סק"ג.

4.

נשמת אברהם שם סק"ד.

5.

כל זה בנשמת אברהם שם, וציין גם לשו"ת אגרות משה יו"ד ח"ב סי' קע"ד ולשו"ת ציץ אליעזר חי"ג סי' פ"ז.

6.

כל זה ג"כ בנשמת אברהם שם.

Typo in Meshech Chochmo

משך חכמה על דברים פרק יא פסוק לא

(לא) וירשתם אותה וישבתם בה - דעת הרמב"ן (ספר המצות מ"ע ד לרמב"ן) דישיבת ארץ ישראל בעשה. והרד"מ (חדושי רב דוב בער מייזליש לסה"מ שם) בחדושיו תמה ממה דדריש ר' שמלאי במסכת סוטה (דף יד) מ"מ נתאוה משה לכנוס לא"י כו' הרבה מצות כו' ואין מתקיים אלא בארץ כו'. ומאי מקשה, הלא ישיבת ארץ ישראל עשה היא בעצמה עיי"ש. ולק"מ, דלפי זה בני גד וב"ר לא יקיימו מצות ישיבת ארץ ישראל, ובודאי אינו כן, דקיימו גם בארץ סיחון ועוג מצוה זו, שזהו האמורי מה שאמר (במדבר ס"פ לג) והורשתם את הארץ וישבתם בה, וא"כ מדוע הי' משה מבקש לכנוס לארץ, ודאי כל זמן שלא הי' כבוש וחלוק בארץ היו מקיימים בזה ישיבת א"י. וזה פשוט

I think there's a typo in the last line.
נ"ל שיש טעה"ד בשורה האחרונה.

וצ"ל: ודאי כל זמן שלא הי' כבוש וחלוק בארץ [לא] היו מקיימים בזה ישיבת א"י