Discovering Rav Elyashiv zt"l
My article in the current issue of Jewish Action
(It appears there in a slightly more polished version, courtesy of JA's editors)
Rav Elyashiv zt"l was an opaque person. His public persona did
not give us a sense of who he was. He was a closed book, and it is not clear
that the book can ever be opened. Rav Elyashiv did not write in a systematic manner. Even his teshuvos,
which he himself wrote, are only available as edited by his talmidim –
who have inserted many ellipses, limiting the personal quality of Rav
Elyashiv's writings.
1:18
A teshuva written to the Kaliver Rebbe shlita.
In 1985, the Kaliver Rebbe suggested a takkanah to recite the pesukim
of Shema Yisrael following Aleynu every morning. The intent
of the takkanah was to use that practice as a means to unite ourselves
with the memory of the six million kedoshim of the Shoah.
Rav Elyashiv begins his response by acknowledging that the
Rebbe himself is a survivor of the Shoah, and that obviously the memory
of that horrific time is always with the Rebbe in a way that Rav Elyashiv
himself is not. Nevertheless, continues Rav Elyashiv, since the Rebbe asked his
opinion, he would give it.
Rav Elyashiv relates that shortly after the Shoah a
proposal was made to institute a fixed, permanent fast day to remember that
tragic period. At the times, recalls Rav Elyashiv, the Chazon Ish zt”l
came out against the proposal, saying that our generation is one that had best
remain silent, and is not worthy of introducing permanent enactments.
This earlier repudiation of a similar proposal in and of itself, writes Rav
Elyashiv, may suffice to negate the Rebbe's proposal. But, adds Rav Elyashiv,
there is an additional issue here. The Kaliver Rebbe's expressed intent was
that this practice serve as a time of contemplation l'hisyached im
ha'kedoshim – “to unite with the martyrs” – is not a form of contemplation
that we find in our classic sources, in Chazal.
Rav Elyashiv here manifests an approach that is not unique,
yet is noteworthy as a hallmark of the Lithuanian approach to Jewish practice:
Sentiment is not an adequate basis for a public policy, even if the policy does
not clash with any specific Halachic parameter. Even though can be no inherent
Halachic objection to an individual repeating Shma after davening, its
repetition as a formal ritual is objectionable in and of itself, so long as it
is not grounded in a known form of Avodas Hashem sanctioned by Chazal.
1:130
In a similar teshuva, Rav Elyashiv responds to an
unidentified correspondent whose parents has perished in the Shoah, who
wanted to purchase unused land in a cemetery and erect a monument there to
memorialize his parents.
Rav Elyashiv begins his response by considering the issues
that may be involved in this case. We know that we are forbidden to emulate
inherently non-Jewish rituals.
The Rema (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 178) defines inherently
non-Jewish rituals as either ceremonies that manifest lewdness (pritzus),
or ceremonies in which they engage for no apparent reason. Since the ceremonies
are not grounded in any apparent reason, we must take into account that they
are grounded in heathen worship or superstition (Darchei Emori). On the
other hand, writes the Rema, non-Jewish rituals that are based on obvious and positive motivations may be
adopted by us. Accordingly, it would seem, that the erection of such a monument
– while admittedly a form of commemoration of non-Jewish origin – should be
permissible, as it is obviously and positively grounded in the questioner's
quest to honor his parents.
However, continues Rav Elyashiv, the Gra (to Shulchan
Aruch ibid.) rules stringently, that we are even forbidden to adopt
non-Jewish rituals that are based on
obvious and positive motivations. This
would seem to rule out the erection of the monument. However, continues Rav
Elyashiv, it is not clear that the practice of erecting commemorative monuments
is, indeed, of non-Jewish origin. After all, we find Avshalom, who had no
heirs, erecting for himself already during his lifetime, the commemorative
monument known as Yad Avshalom. And the Gra would also allow us
to adopt rituals common among non-Jews if they can be traced to our own practices
as recorded in Tanach.
On the other hand, writes Rav Elyashiv, we must also
consider the use of the land of the cemetery for this purposes. The land of a
cemetery is similar to the status of a synagogue in a location frequented by
the public – viz., such land can only be used for its stated purpose – which,
in this case, would seem to be the burial of the dead, not the erection of
monuments. However, after citing and analyzing several sources, Rav Elyashiv
concludes that there is sufficient Halachic basis to permit this manner of
usage of cemetery grounds.
But... concludes Rav Elyashiv, even though Din Torah
allows for the erection of such a monument, from the perspective of Da'as
Torah this is not a laudable venture (Ein ruach chachamim nocha heimena).
Rather, the questioner should consider one of time-honored manners of
commemorating the departed – e.g., by donating something [such as a light
fixture, etc.] to a shul [to which one could, of course, affix a
plaque], which would generate merit for the deceased and commemorate him at the
same time.
Here again Rav Elyashiv here manifests an approach that is
not unique, yet is noteworthy – and which enhances our understanding of his teshuva
to the Kaliver Rebbe: Halacha is the letter of the law (Din Torah), but
the knowledge and observance of Halacha inculcates us with a “sensitivity” to
its spirit (Da'as Torah).
More precisely, perhaps, Halacha consists of both rulings (Din) and
opinions (Da'as). In both these teshuvos Rav Elyashiv is
clarifying that even if something may be permitted according to a narrow
ruling, it may still remain out of sync with the value system of the Halachic
minded. And, in cases where the questioner is motivated by sentiment, the
spirit of the law should definitely prevail.
3:28
Most of this teshuva is clearly missing. As it
“starts” with paragraph Gimmel (3). But the part of the teshuva that
has been published is fascinating. The question under discussion is the
propriety of exaggerating in stories about Gedolim. Rav Elyashiv writes
that it is inappropriate to do so. He cites the Taz in Yoreh Deah
344. There the Shulchan Aruch rules that in a eulogy we mention the good
traits of the departed and we “add a bit” (mosifin ketzas). On this
ruling the Taz asks, what difference does it make if a lie is a big lie
or small lie?! A lie is a lie! Rav Elyashiv explains the Shulchan Aruch's
meaning: You can add something that you can assume – based on your knowledge of
the deceased – that he would have done were he to be in that situation.
3:29
The next teshuva concerns a related issue. The teshuva
is addressed to Rabbi Boruch Horovitz shlita, Rosh HaYeshiva
of Yeshivas Dvar Yerushalayim. Rabbi Horovitz published Matteh Levi, the
responsa of his grandfather, Rabbi Marcus Horovitz zt”l, who was the
Orthodox rabbi of the Grossgemeinde
in Frakfurt-am-Main. In one of the teshuvos, Rabbi Horovitz discusses
the renowned incident of the “Cleves Get,”
and argues in favor of the position of the Frankfurt Beis Din nullifying
the get – a ruling that was opposed by virtually every other Halachic
authority of 18th century world Jewry.
Rav Elyashiv begins by stating the facts of the case, and
postulating that were the controversy to have arisen at a time in which a
Sanhedrin existed, the Frankfurt Beis Din would have been in violation
of the Torah prohibition of Lo Sasur. Moreover, writes Rav Elyashiv,
even in later generations there still exists the concept of “The Lord stands
with the community of God” (Elokim nitzav b'adas Keil), and the majority
of Chachmei Yisrael cannot be mistaken.
Rav Elyashiv continues that, be that as it may, he could not
understand why Rabbi Horovitz reprinted all the pronouncements and bans issued
by the Frankfurt Beis Din, which were derisive and degrading of great Rabbonim
of the time. Granted, at the time of the controversy, when tempers were
flaring, excessive zeal understandably may have led the Frankfurt Beis Din to
act inappropriately – but what justification was there to bring these matters
up now? There is no doubt that so many years after the controversy died down,
when all the combatants have already been for so long in the Olam HaEmes,
that they can have no pleasure from the re-opening of the issue. And, concluded
Rav Elyashiv, even if your grandfather's teshuva and its publication can
somehow be justified as an halachic excursus, how can you justify the
publication of the scandalous material surrounding the episode? Such
publication surely clashes with Kavod HaTorah.
In these two teshuvos Rav Elyashiv again teaches that
there is Din Torah and there is Da'as Torah. More precisely,
perhaps, Halacha consists of both rulings (Din) and opinions (Da'as).
In both these latter teshuvos Rav Elyashiv is clarifying that our
recollections of individuals and events must also be subjected to the scrutiny
of the value system of that complements narrow Halachic parameters.
3:141
In this teshuva, Rav Elyashiv considers the status of
a non-Jew who studies Torah. He quotes a remarkable Meiri. The Meiri
remarks that a Jew who attempts to grow in piety by making a holiday – be it of
his own invention, or observing our days of rest – is punished. On the other
hand, if a non-Jew attempts to grow in piety in any other manner, he is to be
encouraged. The Meiri asserts that such voluntary piety on the part of a
non-Jew is to be regarded by us as akin to voluntary sacrificial offerings
brought by a non-Jew, which we are told to accept.
As far as a non-Jew learning Torah, writes the Meiri,
it depends if he is learning merely to gain knowledge of Judaism – which should
not be allowed – or to grow in piety – which should be encouraged, even if his
studies concern mitzvos that are not included in the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei
Noach, the Seven Noahide Laws.
At first glance, the Meiri's position seems
difficult, since the Gemara itself only lauds the non-Jew's Torah learning if
it is focused on one of the Sheva Mitzvos. Rav Elyashiv resolves
the issue, explaining that the Meiri's opinion is that since a non-Jew
is permitted to perform any mitzvah other than those that concern holidays,
once he undertakes to fulfill any mitzvah it has for him the same status as the
Sheva Mitzvos. Why, then, did Chazal express themselves in a
manner that might lead us to mistakenly limit the learning of a non-Jew to studies
of the Sheva Mitzvos? Rav Elyashiv suggests that it was so as to teach
us that the learning must pertain to a mitzvah that can be fulfilled in our day
and age. The implication is that just as the Sheva Mitzvos are always
applicable, so too whatever the non-Jew studies must pertain to a mitzvah that
is currently applicable.
3:231
This teshuva, written in 2004, is addressed to the
American posek Rabbi Feivel Cohen shlita. Rabbi Cohen posed the
unfortunate contemporary question, whether it is permissible to inform the
authorities of the activities of a child molester.
Rav Elyashiv bases his response on Teshuvos HaRashba
(3:393) who writes that when there are clear witnesses that someone has
committed crimes, Beis Din is allowed – even in our day and age – to
impose upon him monetary fines and corporal punishment. The Rashba
asserts that this is a part of our responsibility of kiyum ha'olam, to
sustain the world. For were we to limit our punishments to the precise
parameters that we find in Torah, our code of law would not suffice to maintain
society. It is therefore appropriate for Beis Din to proactively enact
appropriate laws in addition to the laws of the Torah – so long as the
government of the time and place gives us the authority to do so.
Rav Elyashiv adds that even if the government does not grant
us such autonomous authority, it remains incumbent on Beis Din to ensure
tikkun ha'olam. Therefore, even if we cannot ourselves impose the
penalties, the tikkun ha'olam of curtailing molestation is sufficient
reason to inform the authorities of the perpetrator (so long, qualifies Rav
Elyashiv, as the charge is borne out by evidence).
In these last two teshuvos we come full circle. Here
too, Da'as Torah influences and even shapes practice – beyond the scope
of narrow Halachic rulings. In the case of the non-Jew learning Torah, it is
the Meiri whose Da'as Torah rejects the narrow limitation of Sheva
Mitzvos, permitting any learning that is beneficial to the spiritual state
of the non-Jew. In the case of the molester, it is the Rashba whose Da'as
Torah rejects the narrow limitation of Beis Din's powers, encouraging
all that is necessary to sustain society. In both cases, of course, Rav
Elyashiv follows in the footsteps of the Rishonim he cites.
All of the teshuvos that we have seen relate more to
public policy than to normative Halachic practices. These are not “beracha on corn flakes”
she'eilos. Decisions in these areas require a scope of vision and a
depth of sensitivity. Here we have tried to get beyond the opacity in which Rav
Elyashiv zt”l was often hidden. May his merit sustain us, and may his
Torah – together with the Torah of all Gedolei Yisroel of all times –
guide us along the path of Avodas Hashem towards the ultimate tikkun
olam b'malchus Shaddai.
