Sunday, March 19, 2017

R' Gedalia Nadel's Explanation of Kavua, Similar to Prof. Aumann's "Moral Hazard" Theory of Kavua, And A Note from Myself


p. 31 of the pdf


 בתורתו של ר׳ גדליה

  מדברי תורתו של הגאון ר׳ גדליהו נדל זצ״ל
  כתב יצחק שילת
הוצאת שילת מעלה אדומים תשם״ד


 וזהו הטעם להבדל בין פל דפריש לבין קבוע: כשאנו מוצאים חתיכת בשר בחוץ ורוצים לקבוע את תכונתה - לגבי חתיכה זו כל החנויות שבעיר הן ״תערובת״ אחת, שממנה החתיכה באה. ״תערובת״ זו היא הרקע העומד מאחורי חתיכה זו, ואנו קובעים את תכונתה של החתיכה לפי תכונתה הקולקטיבית של התערובת, כלומר לפי רוב החנויות. לעומת זאת, כאשר אדם  נכנס לחנות וקונה שם בשר - אין החנויות מעורבות זו עם זו, אלא כל חנות ידועה ומוכרת במקומה ואם אחר כך הוא רוצה להיזכר מאיזו חנות לקח ואינו נזכר, עליו באמת להתייחם לזה כאל ספק, כי אין כאן ״תערובת״, דםר אחד חדש שמכריעים את תכונתו לפי הרוב. מובן שגם זה אינו הכרחי, שכן היה אפשר לומר שמחשבתו של האדם, הרהוריו מהיכן קנה, מצרפים את כל החנויות למציאות &חת שעליה דנים, וגם בזה יש ללכת אחר הרוב, ולכן גם כאן זקוקים אנו ל״גזירת הכתוב״ שתחלק בין קבוע לבין פריש, ותגלה לנו שכל שבא אל מקום הקביעות - כל אחד מן הקבועים נחשב כעומד בפני עצמו, ואין כאן תערובת. אבל לכל גזירת הכתוב יש טעם והיגיון. באמת מוצאים אנו את ההבדל הזה גם בהתייחסות הטבעית של האדם. אדם היודע שיש חנות טריפה וחנויות אחרות כשרות, נזהר מחנות הטריפה, והיא עומדת בתודעתו בפני עצמה, ובמקרה שנכנס לחנות ונעלם ממנו לאן נכנס הוא מבין שהוא במצב של ספק. מה שאין כן במוצא בשר מחוץ לחנויות, כאן הכל מצטמצם בחתיכת בשר זו, אין כאן איסור מבורר, ושייך יותר לסמוך על רוב. ובכלל, כך הוא הדבר ככל האיסורים ובכל המצוות, שהגדרים . ההלכתיים נקבעים לפי ההתרשמות וההתייחסות של האדם

א״ה: פעם אחרי שיעור שבו הזכיר הרב יסוד זה, שהיה חוזר הרבה בדבריו, שאלתיו: זה בגלל קאנט?(עמנואל קאנט, מי שנחשב לגדול הפילוסופיה החדשה, נזכר בכינוי ״הפילוסופים המעיינים״ על ידי המלבי״ם בפירושו לויקרא יט, יח. חידש בתורת ההכרה שהאדם אינו מכיר את העצם כשלעצמו אלא רק את תופעותיו, ועיקר שיטתו זו מביא המלבי׳׳ם בפירושו לאיוב יא, ו). ענה לי הרב: גם בלי קאנט. והסביר שהואיל והמצוות מיועדות לפעול על נפש האדם ולעצב את דמותו המוסרית, לפיכך מה שתשוב לגדר ההלכתי הוא ההתרשמות של האדם מן הדבר, ולא הדבר כשהוא לעצמו.

Today it struck me that, furthermore, there may well be some parallel between סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא and קבוע!

7 comments:

  1. Rabbi, would you agree the last line be used to explain issues in Halacha where we tend to take a less scientific approach. For example we don't do a DNA test to check for Mamzeirus, we don't go over fruit with a magnifying glass, and we don't second guess a beis-din on Gerus ?

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  2. Reb Micha Berger posted the following on Avodah. While I may not agree with everything here, I wanted to share it as it is a good synopsis of where we're holding:

    Part 1:

    R Shimon Shkop is quite apologetic at the opening of Shaarei Yosher,
    because there is no way to make the kelalei birur simple. To quote
    my translation (NOT from the hashkafic part of the haqdamah, found in
    ):
    I know that this book of mine will not be acceptable to all, because
    many who study aren't acclimated to contemplate in an in-depth manner,
    in the deep way that surrounds and goes through the many topics spoken
    of in this book of mine. For there are many approaches to the Torah
    and each person finds meaning according to what he is used to. ALSO,
    IN THAT MOST OF THE TOPICS EXPLAINED IN IT ARE TOPICS THAT DEMAND
    DEPTH AND CONTEMPLATION, AND THEY WILL NOT GRASP THE HEART THAT
    UNDERSTANDS ONLY IN A MERE GLIMPSE. Not all people want to face the
    deficiency in himself [he may find] due to the depth of the concept
    and the deficiency of the conceiver.

    I would therefore assert that any simple explanation can be ruled out as
    oversimplified to the point of error.


    But I think R' Aqiva Eiger's (shu"t #146) / R Gedalia Nadel's (Betoraso
    shel R' Gedaliah pg 52
    )
    shitah is not as bad as all that:

    Qavua is where we had a known entity with a known din, and now we don't
    know that din. Parish is where we encounter an unknown entity. Safeiq
    in the din -- qavua; safeiq in the metzi'us -- parish.

    RGN (pg 53 fn 3) gave the same ta'am hamitzvah for this as I used to
    explain RAE: The role of mitzvos is to refine demuso hamusaris. Therefore,
    what is halaachically significant is human perception, and not the
    thing-in-itself. This is why rov is a factor in resolving a question
    of metzi'us.

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  3. Part 2:


    However, once the din already exists and the safeiq is in what is was,
    the case of 9 chaniyos, one has a different perception of the meat
    because one knows there is a real issur hanging about.

    Until that footnote, RGN's talk about qavua revolves around the caution
    one would have / should have around something that has a real issur. Which
    sounds like R/Nobel Laureate/Prof Uri ("Robert") Aumann's (RAU) "Moral
    Hazard Theory". But I see now he is really going in a different direction.


    RRA defined the term Moral Hazard to RYGB

    as "We say that a situation with an uncertain outcome is fraught with
    "moral hazard" if an *interested* party -- one that stands to gain
    or lose from the outcome -- can influence it." more reason to play
    it safe.

    And then, as RYGB summarized in an earlier post:
    even if you are perfectly willing to pay double the premiums,
    an insurer will not issue you a second identical policy on your
    car. This is because you now have an incentive to disregard your
    normal parameters of morality and arrange to have your car stolen --
    after all, you will make a tidy profit on the theft. You might not
    even make such arrangements -- you are, of course, a /very/ moral
    person -- but you may be more negligent about removing your keys
    from the ignition and locking the door. It might not even be a
    conscious reaction.

    Kol d'parish eliminates any "moral hazard." I was not active in
    generating the safek, and neither my conscious nor subconscious issues
    bear on the scenario.

    In a case of kavua, however, I was active in creating the safek. I
    went into the store, I threw the rock, etc. Therefore, my issues bear
    on the scenario. For example, I might have a subconscious drive to
    eat treif which impels me to a non-kosher store - of which I myself
    am not conscious.

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  4. Part 3:

    RAU's explanation works well for the case I brought from the AhS,
    the difference between whether a man goes to the woman, in which case
    we assume the man is from rov of the city; or if she goes to him, in
    which case qol deparish -- even a mi'ut of pesulim could pasl her to
    marry a kohein.

    But I don't think it works in general. RYGB ad loc mentions Zevachim 73b,
    top of the amud, where chasing animal away would qualify as kol deparish,
    even though the person doing the chasing is an interested party.

    Someone in RYGB's comment chain asked a question, which he addresses in
    a third post:
    The gemara (9b) discusses a scenario where nine piles of matza and
    one pile of chametz are lying around before Pesach. A mouse comes and
    takes a piece from one of the piles and enters a house. However, we do
    not know if it took chametz or matza and thus are in doubt whether the
    house must be checked once again for chametz. The gemara distinguishes
    between a case where the mouse is seen taking a piece directly from
    one of the piles ["kavu'a"] and an instance where the piece snatched
    by the mouse was first isolated from the piles ["parish"]. These two
    cases are said to be analogous, respectively, to two cases considered
    in Ketubot (15a): "If there are nine stores which sell kosher meat
    and one which sells non-kosher meat and someone took [meat] from
    one of them but he doesn't know from which one he took, the meat
    is forbidden. But if [a piece of meat] is found [not in a store],
    follow the majority." Thus if the majority of stores from which the
    meat might have originated are kosher, the meat is permitted.

    RYGB suggests answers. In Zevachim he says there may be one in Tosafos,
    in antoher he points to "neini'ach" in the Rambam (Chameitz uMatza 2:10)
    -- the acting interested party is the one who put the pile where mice
    could get at it.

    But I find it really dachuq to say we're being machmir to avoid people from
    leaving chameitz laying around in case a mouse takes it ONLY IF HE IS
    SEEN, because then it's qavua.

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  5. Part 4:

    Wearer argument, but I am throwing it in anyway: I also find it
    unrealistic for this kind of cheshash-based pesaq to be behind a din
    deOraisa, like qavua, rather than deRabbanan. Not a strong argument,
    just part of why I don't feel at home with RAU's shitah.

    (Okay, to be honest, we know the real reason why: I already had a pet
    theory before I learned his well enough to realize it differed. But the
    notion of saying a deOraisa exists because of a cheshash fits my bias.)

    Last, what about qol qavua where the issur is derabbanan, and kemechtza
    al mechtza is more meiqil than rov?


    Last, there is R/Prof Moshe Koppel's theory. in which the distinction
    See , or better -- his article
    in the first edition of Higayon (put out by Bar Ilan, edited by RMK):

    When do we assign a status to an item as an individual and when do we
    assign a status to an item as part of a set? If prior to the raising
    of the issue of status, the item in question is an undistinguished
    element of some set (kavu'a), then the item is assigned the status of
    the set. If, however, the item is in some way distinct from the set
    (parish), it is assigned its own status.

    Consider the case of the stores mentioned above, of which nine out
    of ten sell kosher meat (Ketubot 15a). The critical moment for our
    purposes is the moment immediately preceding the initial encounter
    with the piece of meat in question. If this initial encounter occurs
    while the meat is in the store, the meat is regarded simply as
    an undistinguished member of a mixed set and its status is thus
    indeterminate (mechtza al mechtza). If the initial encounter
    occurs while the meat is on the street and is thus not associated
    with one of the elements of the set of stores, it must be assigned
    its own status. Unlike a mixed set of pieces of meat, an individual
    piece of meat is either kosher or non-kosher; its status is not
    indeterminate, but rather unknown. In such a case, we must choose
    between the two possibilities -- kosher or non-kosher -- and we use
    the majority principle in order to do so.

    But he doesn't give the taam hamitzvah for it that RGN does. Instead he
    explains it in terms of sample spaces -- when do we count the stores to
    determine rov stores, and when do we count the meat to determine rov
    meat?

    ... In fact, the difference between the way a kavu'a case is handled
    and the way a parish case is handled can be neatly expressed in
    terms of sample spaces. In the case of parish, some natural sample
    space is chosen, e.g., the set of stores. (What makes a particular
    sample space "natural" is an interesting question which I won't
    attempt to answer here.) In the case of kavu'a, the chosen sample
    space consists of the SINGLE element consisting of the entire set,
    which is neither kosher nor non-kosher.

    But aside from sactificing RGN's tie to the big picture, I find
    it difficult to wrap my head around the idea that the parish, the
    differentiated member of the sample space, is the one that uses the
    natural sample space, and the one that is qavua within that space is not.

    (And again, my natural bias for my pet theory probably has my mind pretty
    closed regardless of attempts to be fair.)

    -Micha

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  6. I also wanted to elaborate a bit on my connection to סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה:

    In Taharos 5:7, the Tiferes Yisroel in the Boaz #13 gives a comprehensive overview of סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא, based on the Tosafos Yom Tov and the Tosafos R' Akiva Eiger ad loc.

    Now, סמוך מיעוטא לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא is only according to R' Meir. Of particular interest in this regard is the passage in the cited Tiferes Yisroel, p. 370 in the Mishnayos' pagination, that R' Meir considers a typical case of רוב and מיעוט to be a ספק השקול. Rabbanan obviously disagree. But it could be theorized that קבוע is a manner in which even according to Rabbanan a case of רוב and מיעוט can become a ספק השקול - i.e., סמוך קבוע לחזקה ואיתרע ליה רובא When I broached the idea to my chevrusa, he dismissed it, and he may be right, but I only thought of it two days ago.

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