"The Master" — Eruvin 63a

"The Master" — Eruvin 63a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף סג/א

רבינא סר סכינא בבבל אמר ליה רב אשי מאי טעמא עבד מר הכי

Generally, the words אמר מר — The Master said — precede the Gemara's analysis of the statement of a Tanna. Yad Malachi (Aleph §73) inquires as to whether we ever find the honorific Mar associated with an Amora. Halichos Eli (§83) notes that there is a case (Avodah Zarah 50a) in which R' Yochanan is afforded that title, but that may be an exception, as R' Yochanan is considered by some authorities to have had the status of a Tanna. He does note, however, that we do find Rav Huna addressed as Mar. The Yad Malachi himself notes that in Rosh HaShanah (20b) we find that R' Zeira is addressed as Mar, and he proceeds to cite other instances in which Amoraim received the title. (He also notes that elsewhere he has demonstrated that R' Yochanan does not have the status of a Tanna.)

In his notes to this Klal, the Yad Malachi cites other cases in which the honorific is given to Amoraim. So who does get the honorific? He cites a gloss to the Peirush HaMishnayos of the Rambam that Mar is always the title given to the Rebbe in a Rebbe-Talmid dialogue. However, asserts the Yad Malachi, our Gemara contradicts that position, as here Rav Ashi— who was senior — addresses Ravina— who was junior — as Mar. (He brings other proofs to contradict the aforementioned gloss.) Evidently, then, Mar is used inconsistently, at the discretion of the one person addressing another person.

Non-Jewish Residents and Owner — Eruvin 62a

Non-Jewish Residents and Owner — Eruvin 62a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף סב/א

דכולי עלמא דירת עובד כוכבים לא שמה דירה

From The Contemporary Eruv:

The Gemara explains that, strictly speaking, the domain of a non-Shomer Shabbos resident should not prevent a fellow resident from carrying on Shabbos within the enclosed area that they share. The Halacha remains that whenever a single Jewish individual or family shares the enclosed area with any number of non-Jews, no sechiras reshus is required. For example, in the case of a triplex, there are several possible configurations: a) Three Jewish families; b) Two Jewish (Shomer Shabbos) families and one non-Jewish family; c) One Jewish family and two non-Jewish families. In the first configuration only eruvei chatzeiros among the three families is required. In the second configuration we would require the two Jewish families to make an eruvei chatzeiros between themselves and to contract a sechiras reshus from the non-Jewish family as well. In the third configuration we would require no additional procedures at all. The solitary Jewish family needs make neither eruvei chatzeiros nor sechiras reshus. We can easily apply the principles that we have just outlined to apartment buildings and other situations where more people reside together within an enclosed area.

A potential consequence of this Halacha applies if one has the misfortune to land in an airport (outside the State of Israel) after Shabbos has begun. If, as often happens, one can walk within an uninterrupted enclosed area from the airplane, through the terminal, to an attached hotel, one may carry one's luggage the entire way. Different authorities might own these areas. Since, however, their status is one of exclusive non-Jewish ownership, no sechiras reshus is necessary to carry from one area to another.

A Person who does not admit to the concept of Eruv — Eruvin 61b

A Person who does not admit to the concept of Eruv — Eruvin 61b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף סא/ב

הדר עם העובד כוכבים בחצר או עם מי שאינו מודה בעירוב הרי זה אוסר עליו רבי אליעזר בן יעקב אומר לעולם אינו אוסר עד שיהו שני ישראלים אוסרין זה על זה

A person who dwells with a non-Jew in a courtyard or with someone who does not admit to the [concept of] eruv, that person forbids him [i.e. the first person from carrying]. R' Eliezer ben Yaakov says: He [i.e. the non-Jew or the person who does not admit to the eruv] does not forbid until two Jews forbid each other.

From The Contemporary Eruv:

We require eruvei chatzeiros in most cases in which an eruv includes two or more Shomer Shabbos (Shabbos observant) Jewish residents. Sechiras Reshus is necessary when the eruv includes residents who are not Shomrei Shabbos — either because they are not Jewish or because they are not observant. In sechiras reshus, the person who would like to carry in an enclosed area on Shabbos asks the residents or owners of the other dwellings in the area to rent to him the right to carry in the area in question. Since the acquisition of the right is symbolic in nature, the rent paid may be symbolic as well. The Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 87:14 differentiates between informed Jews who are familiar with the Halachos of Shabbos, yet do not observe them, with whom sechiras reshus must be contracted, and “tinokos shenishbu” — Jews who do not observe Shabbos because they grew up in ignorance of its parameters, who should be included in an eruv chatzeiros. Although the Halacha of a Mechalel Shabbos is like that of a non-Jew in many aspects of Hilchos Eruvin, sechiras reshus may be required where a solitary Shomer Shabbos lives with one or more Mechalelei Shabbos. Prevailing practice, in such cases, is to implement both procedures.

Greater in Wisdom and Age — Eruvin 57a

Greater in Wisdom and Age — Eruvin 57a

תוספות עירובין דף נז/א

ואור"ת דהלכה כרב הונא דאמר קרפף לזו וקרפף לזו דגדול היה בחכמה ובמנין מחייא בר רב דזוטר מיניה טובא כדמוכח בסוף פרק יש בערכין (דף טז) שהיה רב הונא מוכיחו

Rabbeinu Tam rules in accordance with Rav Huna, because he was greater in wisdom and age than Chiya bar Rav. This principle, laid down in Avodah Zarah 7a, is similar to the principle that a second Beis Din cannot nullify the prior enactment of another Beis Din unless it is greater than the first one in wisdom and in numbers (Eduyos 1:5; see Ra'avad ad loc. for the age factor).

Some parameters of this principle from Yad Malachi:

1. This principle only applies if it is clear that the first Beis Din would not have consented. However, if circumstances have changed to the extent that it is clear that the first Beis Din would have consented to rule differently, the second Beis Din may nullify the first one's ruling (§65).
2. This principle only applies to a nullification of the prior enactment. A second Beis Din may, however, add to the first Beis Din's enactment (§66). [Elsewhere, however, Yad Malachi seems to contradict himself (Klalei HaDinim, Aleph §73).]
3. A second Beis Din can nullify the first Beis Din's enactment temporarily (הוראת שעה), at times and in places where special exigencies exist (§67).
4. Although a second rabbi cannot permit that which another rabbi previously forbade, if the second rabbi is greater in wisdom and age than the first rabbi he may reverse the first rabbi's ruling (Klalei HaDinim, Ches §232).

Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 1:127 cites Chasam Sofer, Yoreh Deah §13, who maintains that a rabbi in his city has the same status as a Beis Din, and that therefore another rabbi cannot nullify the first rabbi's enactments unless he is greater in wisdom and age than the first rabbi. Igros Moshe clarifies that this is only in the case of enactments. However, if the first rabbi had only consented to the congregation's enactments, or had only issued advice, then the second rabbi may nullify the first rabbi's ruling even if he is not greater than him in wisdom and age.

Adjacent Eruvin — Eruvin 60a

Adjacent Eruvin — Eruvin 60a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף ס/א

[[דף נט/ב: והאמר רב נחמן אמר שמואל אנשי חצר ואנשי מרפסת ששכחו...

...ולא עירבו אם יש לפניהם דקה ארבעה אינה אוסרת ואם לאו אוסרת הכא במאי עסקינן בדלא גבוה מרפסת עשרה ואי לא גבוה מרפסת עשרה כי קא עביד דקה מאי הוי במגופפת עד עשר אמות דכיון דעביד דקה איסתלוקי איסתלוק ליה מהכא

In the absence of a dakah — a low opening, but at least four tefachim high, in front of an alley that signifies its separation from its environs — the members of an alley that did not participate in an eruv forbid the members of the adjacent alley who did make an eruv from carrying. [The Acharonim discuss the question of whether a Tzuras HaPesach suffices in this regard.]

For this reason, one cannot make an eruv for half a city (i.e., multiple eruvin in a single city — see above, 59a-b). There is a dispute as to the actual Halachah:

1. Rashi, Rosh, Maharam MeRotenburg — This is only the case with a private city that became a public city — since they originally had on unified eruv they may not now split into two distinct eruvin, unless each alley has a dakah. However, a city that was always public may make separate eruvin with lechayayim or koros (pillars or beams at the edge of each alley).
2. Ramban, Rashba — Even a city that was always public may not make separate eruvin with lechayayim or koros. However, this is only the case where the distinct eruvin are adjacent one to another and the lechayayim or koros are only dividing one area in which carrying is permitted from another area in which carrying is permitted. On the other hand, to set off an areas in which carrying is permitted from an area in which carrying is not permitted, lechayayim or koros do suffice.

[A public city that does not include a Reshis HaRabbim (viz., its main road has only one exit) has more lenient Halachic guidelines that a public city that does include a Reshus HaRabbim.]

Private Cities, Public Cities — Eruvin 59a

Private Cities, Public Cities — Eruvin 59a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נט/א

משנה עיר של יחיד ונעשית של רבים מערבין את כולה ושל רבים ונעשית של יחיד אין מערבין את כולה אלא אם כן עשה חוצה לה כעיר חדשה שביהודה שיש בה חמשים דיורין דברי רבי יהודה רבי שמעון אומר שלש חצירות של שני בתים:

1. The Definition of a Private City (עיר של יחיד)

1. Rashi — does not have 600,000 residents.
2. Ramban, Rashba, Ritva, Ba'al HaMa'or — belongs to an individual (even if it has 600,000 residents.

2. The Definition of a Private City that became a Public City (נעשית של רבים)

1. Ramban — built by an individual for himself; the population either live in the city by the grace of the owner — who at most, sold them the houses, but retained ownership of streets and highways.
2. Ritva — built by an individual, but thereupon sold by him to the population — however, the population still pays taxes to the original owner.
3. Ba'al HaMa'or — same as Ramban; however, the population pays rent and thus has a share in the city.
4. Rashba — same as Ritva; however, the owner has no financial or governmental relationship to the city — he is no longer owner thereof — it is merely known as "So-and-so's City."
5. Rashi — the city has acquired 600,000 residents, but does not contain a Reshus HaRabbim.

Definitions 1&5 preclude the presence of a Reshus HaRabbim in this city. Definitions 2,3&4 allow for such a possibility.

Eruvin 59a al pi Kabbalah

Interesting:

ספר אוהב ישראל - לשבועות

וי"ל ע"פ דאיתא במסכת עירובין (נט.). עיר של רבים ונעשית של יחיד אין מערבין את כולה וצריכה שיור כדי שלא תשתכח תורת רשות הרבים. עד שישאר חוצה לה כעיר חדשה שביהודה. שהיה בה חמשים דיורין. ע"כ יעו"ש. ולהבין זאת למה דוקא נו"ן דיורין א"צ שיור. וכדפסקינן הילכתא דעיר חדשה עצמה א"צ שיור. וכמבואר בפוסקים הלכה למעשה. י"ל, כי סוד העירוב הוא סוד יחוד וקישור עלמין עילאין בעלמין תתאין בסוד יחוד הוי"ה אדנ"י. לבל יהיה אחיזה לחיצונים ר"ל. ולזה עיר של רבים צריכה שיור. כדי שלא תשתכח תורת רה"ר. כדפירש"י. והיינו כי רה"ר הוא מקום שיש אחיזה לחיצונים ר"ל. וסוד העירוב הוא לקשר ולייחד הק'. לבל יהיה אחיזה לחיצונים ר"ל. אמנם עכ"ז צריך לישאר מקום בחוץ לעירוב לאחיזתם. ולזה צריכים שיור לעירוב. אמנם כשישנו חמשים דיורין א"צ שיור. כי הנה כל רצועה שבא"י מרמזת לארץ חפץ החיים ארץ הקדושה סוד המלוכה הק'. וכמו שיש בעלמא דבינה סוד ה' עילאה בסוד ה' אותיות מנצפ"ך. וכ"א כלול מעשר והם חמשים שערי בינה, והוא בסוד חג השבועות הזה סוד שער הנו"ן כידוע ליודעי חן. ככה ישנו חמשים שערים בסוד המלוכה הק' סוד ה' תתאה. וצריך לייחדם ולקשרם יואגדו אלה באלה. אלו הנו"ן. באלו הנו"ן. לבל יהיה אחיזת החיצונים ר"ל בהמלוכה הק' ח"ו רק שיהיה מלכותו בכל משלה ולסוד זה צריך שיור לעירוב כעיר חדשה שהיתה ביהודה שהיה בה נו"ן דיורין. כדי שיהיה מקום להשראת הק' של נ' שערי בינה העליונים הקדושים והבן זה:

The Credibility of a Solitary Witness — Eruvin 58b

The Credibility of a Solitary Witness — Eruvin 58b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נח/ב

ואפילו עבד אפילו שפחה נאמנין לומר עד כאן תחום שבת שלא אמרו חכמים את הדבר להחמיר אלא להקל:

תוספות עירובין דף נט/א

ותחומין דרבנן - משמע אי הוה דאורייתא לא מהימני ואע"ג דמעשה בכל יום שמאמינין לנשים בשחיטה וניקור

ולתרום חלה היינו משום דהוי בידה קודם שנעשית השחיטה הוי בידה לשחוט אבל לתחומין לא הוי כלל בידה

The mishnah tells us that even slaves are believed to testify as to the extent of the Techum Shabbos of a locality.

The Gemara (below, 59a) tells that the reason why we are lenient to such an extent is because the 2000 amos of Techum Shabbos are a rabbinic enactment. The obvious inference is that if the 2000 amah limit had been Torah law, we would not be allowed to accept the testimony of the slaves.

For that matter, assume the Tosafos (ad loc., d.h. U'techumin), we would not be allowed to accept the testimony of any person whose testimony is not acceptable in a court of law. Thus, we would not be allowed to accept the testimony of a woman. Yet, ask the Tosafos, we regularly believe women concerning more severe areas of Torah law — viz., kashrus and niddah, etc. — why not in connection with Techum Shabbos?

The Tosafos respons that we only accept the testimony of women and other witnesses who cannot testify in a court of law when they testify concerning a matter that is, or at least was, under her control (בידה) at some point. For example, at some point in the past a woman could have exercised her control on this piece of meat (while It was still a part of a live cow) and slaughtered it properly. Or, at some point, either in the past or the present, a woman who was a niddah could have exercise her control of her actions and immersed in a mikvah. The extent of the Techum Shabbos, on the other hand, is an objective matter of measurement, not subject to her control, and therefore a matter in which we cannot credit her testimony.

The Beis HaLevi (Teshuvos 2:37.4) derives from this discussion a fundamental stringency regarding the credibility of any solitary witness — even a male, since the testimony of a solitary man is also not accepted in a court of law. To whit, a solitary witness of a any gender or background is never credited unless the matter of his or her testimony is one that was at one time subject to his or her control. From our case we see that this principle applies even to a case in which there is no a priori assumption of a prohibition (חזקת איסור), as there is no a priori assumption that a specific place near a city is beyond its Techum Shabbos.

Relative and Standard Hours — Eruvin 56a

Relative and Standard Hours — Eruvin 56a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נו/א

תקופת ניסן ותקופת תשרי חמה יוצאה בחצי מזרח ושוקעת בחצי מערב שנאמר הולך אל דרום וסובב אל צפון הולך אל דרום ביום וסובב אל צפון בלילה סובב סובב הולך הרוח אלו פני מזרח ופני מערב פעמים מהלכתן ופעמים מסבבתן

We are accustomed to assuming that hours of the day, for purposes of Halacha are relative hours (sha'os zemanios) — viz., the day is divided into twelve equal parts, from dawn to dusk according to the Magen Avraham, and from sunrise to sunset according to the Gra and Baal HaTanya. Hence, a sha'ah zemanis in Chicago today, according to the Gra is 0:46:55 hours.

It ain't necessarily so.

In the first place, the Pnei Yehoshua in the Kunteres Acharon to Berachos goes so far as to say that sha'os zemanios were an invention of the Rambam!

Secondly, the Meshech Chochmah (Bamidbar 25:23) derives that the Halachic hours of the day are standard, 60 minute hours (sha'os shavos) from our Gemara.

He asks why the Torah never uses the term olas ha'boker except in regard to Pesach ("milvad olas ha'boker asher l'olas ha'tamid). He explains that according to the Zohar (Vayakhel 195b; see also R' Tzadok HaKohen, Sefer HaZichronos, Mitzvas Kiddush HaChodesh 3:2 at length) the hours of the Halachic days are indeed standard hours. Thus, zman tefillah is always 10:00 a.m. local standard time, and that is considered the end of the Halachic morning.

Now, as our Gemara notes, it is only in Nisan and Tishrei (equinox days) that the actual night and actual day are equal and the relative hours correspond to the standard hours. Thus, it is only at these times that the four-hour time-frame of the morning tamid is congruent with the actual morning. On the other hand, in the middle of the summer, for example, the actual day might begin with a 4:00 a.m. sunrise, and its end (even if measured in relative hours) is well before 8:30 a.m. Hence, the term olas ha'boker is only appropriate for Nisan and Tishrei. That the Torah only uses it the context of Nisan is because the calendar is always adjusted so Nisan falls at the right time, while Tishrei is not taken into account.

[Much more can be — and has been — written on the topic. One interesting point: According to the Zohar it is easier to understand R' Moshe Feinstein's position that chatzos ha'yom is at the same time — 11:56 a.m. — every day of the year, even though — as he admits — the two "halves" of a day may not be equal. R' Moshe actually bases his position on our Gemara (see Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 2:20 and 4:17,32.]

Shabbos, Gavra or Cheftza? — Eruvin 55b

Shabbos, Gavra or Cheftza? — Eruvin 55b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נה/ב

אמר ליה רבא דגלי מדבר קאמרת כיון דכתיב בהו על פי ה' יחנו ועל פי ה' יסעו כמאן דקביע להו דמי

R' Yosef Engel (Asvan D'Orysa §10) cites a theory advanced by many Acharonim, that all prohibitions that are time-limited, such as the prohibition to perform melachah on Shabbos or Yom Tov, only pertain to the gavra — the person who performs the melachah, and not to the cheftza — the melachah is performed. Thus, for example, it is only if a Jew cooks that the Shabbos prohibition is violated and the food forbidden. However, if the food was cooked without the involvement of a Jew, the food would not be forbidden (at least not d'orysa).

Accordingly, writes R' Yosef Engel, one can answer the question posed by the Tosafos Yom Tov (Shabbos 7:2), why the melachos are described in the mishnah as "one who plants," and "one who harvests" (הזורע, הקוצר) etc. — why does it not just say "planting" and "harvesting" (זריעה, קצירה) etc.? If we accept, however, that it is not the cheftza of the melachah that is prohibited, but rather the gavra that is prohibited to do the melachah, we readily understand why the mishnah is written in this manner.

R' Yosef Engel cites evidence both for the possibility that Shabbos is a gavra prohibition and for the possibility that Shabbos is a cheftza prohibition. However, the entire issue is predicated on the assumption that Shabbos is a time-limited prohibition. This is not necessarily so.

The Shem MeShmuel (Chayei Sarah 5679) posits that the essential quality of Shabbos is Shevisah — cessation, which in this context means cessation of all mundane concern so as to focus on the will of Hashem. Moreover, as Rashi (Shemos 31:15) writes, Shabbos affords us a permanent, or lasting sense of tranquility (menuchas margo'a), not a temporary respite (menuchas aria).

Asks the Shem MeShmuel, isn't a Sukkah — which is in use for seven days — called a "temporary dwelling" (diras aria)? How then can Shabbos, which is only one day, be defined as permanent?

In answer, the Shem MeShmuel cites his father, the Avnei Nezer, who said that at the onset of every Shabbos all melachah becomes forbidden forever. It is only that through Motzoei Shabbos and Havdalah melachah is again permitted. The Shem MeShmuel likens this to our Gemara, in which Rava states that the construction in the Midbar was considered permanent because each encampment was permanent — it was only as a result of a new command from Hashem that they would leave one encampment and travel to another.

Thus, it is quite possible to define Shabbos not as a time-limited prohibition, but as a permanent prohibition that is (unfortunately) disrupted by Motzoei Shabbos.

May we be zocheh to experience the true permanence of Shabbos, when it will never be disrupted, yom she'kulo Shabbos u'menuchah l'chayei olamim.

Memory Tools — Eruvin 54a-b

Memory Tools — Eruvin 54a-b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נד/א

כי חיים הם למצאיהם ולכל בשרו מרפא אל תקרי למצאיהם אלא למוציאיהם בפה

The Gemara lists several qualities that facilitate the acquisition and retention of Torah, beginning with verbalizing what one is learning.

Sefer Hanhagos HaTzadikkim, Sefer HaZikaron enumerates the memory tools that are to be found in Chazal :

1. Prayer (Megilah 6b).

2. Awe of Heaven (Berachos 32b).

3. Humility (Eruvin 54b).

4. Curtailing pleasure (Eruvin 54a).

5. Diligence and review (Eruvin 54a).

6. Verbalizing what one is learning out loud (Eruvin 53b).

7. Understanding what one is learning (Yerushalmi, Berachos 5:1).

8. Developing novel insights (Chullin 75b).

9. Learning from one teacher (Eruvin 53a).

10. Learning in seclusion (Yerushalmi, Berachos 4:1 [also here, Eruvin 54a]).

11. Learning with students (Eruvin 54a).

12. Learning in a shul (Yerushalmi, Berachos 5:1).

13. Learning from a sefer (ibid.).

14. Employing mnemonic devices (Eruvin 53a).

15. Eating breakfast (Bava Metzia 107b).

16. Eating bread baked over coals, or, alternatively, wheat bread (Horios 13b).

17. Eating fully baked breas (Kol Bo §118).

18. Eating moist, soft, roasted eggs (Horios 13b).

19. Regularly consuming olive oil (ibid.).

20. Regularly consuming wine and fragrances (ibid.).

21. Eating water left over from the process of kneading dough (ibid.).

22. Dipping a finger in salt and eating (ibid.).

23. Gazing at the countenance of a tzaddik (Taamei HaMinhagim p. 517).

24. A person who maintains he is forgetful is spared from forgetting (ibid. p.543).

25. Reciting Ahavah Rabbah [with kavanah] (Eliyahu Rabbah §224).

26. Reciting the names of Rav Pappa's ten sons at a siyum (HaEshkol, Hil. Sefer Torah).

27. One remembers more effectively what one learns in his youth (Avos 4:19).

28. Taking care not to think Torah thoughts where it is forbidden, or during davening (Sefer Chassidim §546).

DHmY: Rambam Rules in Accordance with Yerushalmi - Berachos 48b

DHmY: Rambam Rules in Accordance with Yerushalmi -Berachos 48b

The Rambam in Hil. Berachos 4:6 rules that the bracha on a parperes (an appetizer for which the bracha is mezonos) does not exempt maaseh kedeira (a porridge or the like, for which the bracha is also mezonos). The Nosei Kelim are really concerned with this, and the Rambam's own grandson wanted to change the girsa in the halacha - because in the Bavli it is never resolved, and we should therefore say safek berachos l'kulla.

However, Gilyonei HaShas here and Aruch HaShulchan 176:1-2 both clarify: Whenever the Bavli has a safek, but the Yerushalmi is definite, the Rambam will rule according to the Yerushalmi. The Aruch HaShulchan says this is so obviously the Rambam's derech (and other Rishonim, see the AhS there), that the Rama, who does not rule accordingly, must not have seen the Yerushalmi here, but that the Yerushalmi is "ikkar l'dina."

Dvar HaShem meYerushalmi (DHmY)

Some time ago I tried keeping up a regular Dvar Hashem meYerushalmi (now to be known as DHmY) through our yerushalmi online website, but it fizzled out rather quickly. Since we started the new cycle recently, I'm going to try again, although it will be Mo'ed before I can really pick up. I will keep you posted here too, IY"H.

Twisted Logic — Eruvin 53a

Twisted Logic — Eruvin 53a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נג/א

אמר רבא ואנן כי אצבעתא בקירא לסברא

Rashi explains Rava’s statement as meaning that compared with the Sages of previous generations, our logic is akin to a finger rubbing at hard wax, which cannot penetrate the wax, but only becomes a bit sticky.

The Chasam Sofer gives an alternative explanation (Teshuvos 6:85).

In Avos (5:7), among the seven qualities of a Sage, is enumerated the trait of not being afraid to respond. The Rambam in his commentary there explains the trait, writing that it means that a Sage answers quickly, and does not fear nor tremble before the question. The Sage immediately perceives the questioner's error, can respond on the spot, and does not need to resort to extended consideration.

The Chasam Sofer elaborates: There is no end to pilpulim (obscure argumentation or casuistry). Given enough time, any person can rebut his fellow's position, and vice versa, from sheer love of debate. Consequently, says Rava, we are like a finger in wax — but in soft wax. Just as a person's finger in wax can twist and shape the wax any way he wants, so too the logic of later generations is not strong and firm, for everyone twists their logic to reach their desired conclusion.

On the other hand, what if a person immediately, without extended consideration, finds a retort that refutes the questioner's error? Then, since he did not take the time to twist logic to formulate a rebuttal, we would treat that retort as an accurate interpretation of his previous position before the give and take began.

Earlier generations, however, could retain objectivity throughout a debate. They would not fall prey to the twisting of logic out of love of debate.

Anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished simultaneously — Eruvin 50a

Anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished simultaneously — Eruvin 50a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נ/א

כל שאינו בזה אחר זה אפילו בבת אחת אינו

The Tashbetz (3:147, cited here in Gilyonei HaShas) writes that the reason why anything that cannot be accomplished sequentially cannot be accomplished simultaneously is because such a case is analogous to the case of: "You and the donkey acquire this" (Bava Basra 143a), in which the law is that just as the donkey cannot acquire the object in question, so too the person also does not acquire it. Here too, since each one of the transactions is precluded by the other, therefore, each one is, vis-à-vis the other transaction, is like a donkey, and therefore each prevents the other from taking effect.

This link is reflected in a case in the Mordechai (Bava Basra §605): "Once upon a time a person simultaneously transferred to his friend ownership over real estate, movable objects and coins all together, through a kinyan sudar [chalifin, the same type of kinyan we use to appoint a Rav as an agent for Mechiras Chametz — such a kinyan is not effective in transferring the ownership of coins]. The great rabbis of the generation disputed the law in this case. Some said it was like the case of "You and the donkey acquire this"… and that just as ownership over the coins was not transferred, neither was ownership over the real estate and movable objects. Others said that since the transaction was effective for the real estate and movable objects, it was also effective for the coins. Rabbeinu Simcha wrote that although the transaction was not effective vis-à-vis the coins, it was effective vis-à-vis the real estate and movable objects… and it cannot be said that this is like the case of "You and the donkey acquire this," as a donkey is not able to effect any transfer of ownership, while coins are subject to transfer of ownership by pulling (meshichah), lifting (hagbahah) and being placed in one's yard (chatzer).

The question may be asked, however, is not the halachah in the case of "You and the donkey acquire this" that the person acquires half of the objects or lands in question? If so, shouldn't everyone concede to Rabbeinu Simcha?

Bigdei Shesh (Bava Basra §46) addresses this issue, and explains that although these sources are borrowing the terminology from the case of "You and the donkey acquire this," the cases are dissimilar in an important way — implied by Rabbeinu Simcha himself. In the literal case of "You and the donkey acquire this," the transaction with the donkey is not a contradiction to the transaction with the person — rather, the transaction with the donkey is void and non-existent, and therefore does not impact on the linked transaction which is void and existent. In these other cases, however, the each of the combined transactions conflict with and contradict the other (indicated by their not being subject to being accomplished sequentially). It is therefore logical to conclude that in this figurative "You and the donkey acquire this," the transactions cancel each other and are both void.

Techum Shabbos and Shabbos — Eruvin 52b

Techum Shabbos and Shabbos — Eruvin 52b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף נב/ב

אמר רבי חנינא רגלו אחת בתוך התחום ורגלו אחת חוץ לתחום לא יכנס דכתיב אם תשיב משבת רגלך רגלך כתיב

According to the Gemara here, when Yeshayahu HaNavi (58:13) comes to shore up the observance of Shabbos, he begins with the topic of Techum Shabbos. Why does he not begin with one of the more severe restrictions?

According to the Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah 11:7), the Torah alludes to Yaakov Avinu's Shemiras Shabbos by hinting at his observance of Techum Shabbos (Bereishis 33:18). Of all the aspects of Shabbos, why specifically Techum Shabbos?

According to Teshuvos HaRashba and Sefer HaEshkol, when the Gemara (Yoma 28b) states that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, it says: "Even Eruvei Techumin" (based on Bereishis 26:5). Why specifically Techum Shabbos?

To answer these questions, R' Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Pri Tzaddik, Vayishlach §8), on the basis of the Zohar (2, 63b) explains that the most fundamental aspect of Kedushas Shabbos is that its kedushah in time should create kedushah in space. The concept of Mei'ein Olam HaBa that underlies Shabbos, says Reb Tzadok, is this idea of bringing the kedushah of that "place" into our space.

It is for this reason that Meseches Shabbos begins with the laws of transferring objects (Hotza'ah) from domain to domain. And this is the underlying concept of Techum Shabbos. This is true of its Torah mandated scope of 12 mil, which alludes to the place of the encampment of the Jews in the Midbar (with its "Kedushas Machaneh" — see Bava Basra 75a). It is also true of the rabbinic scope of 2000 amos. This measure, explains Reb Tzadok, is based on the basic measure of four amos, which is the definition of a "space" even for negative ramifications — viz., distancing oneself while davening from excrement, etc. Since we know that something with positive ramifications is five-hundred-fold greater than something with negative ramifications (see Rashi to Shemos 34:7), a sacred space is five-hundred times greater than the space that can be the opposite — i.e., 2000 amos.

Yaakov Avinu was able to create sacred space even in Chutz La'Aretz, thus bequeathing to us the capacity to create similar space — through Shabbos — wherever we find ourselves (see Vayikra 23:3). It is for this reason that there is an explicit pasuk that alludes to Techum Shabbos in connection to him, while in connection to Avraham Avinu there is only a hint.

"Corners" — Eruvin 51b

"Corners" — Eruvin 51b

רש"י עירובין דף נא/א

פיאות כתיב - דכתיב פאת (נגב) ופאת משמע מרובע

The Gemara tells us that the 2000 amos of Techum Shabbos are derived from the 2000 amos that surround and belong to the cities of the Levi'im. In this context, the Gemara states that Bamidbar 35:5: And you shall measure outside the city, the eastern corner, two thousand amos, teaches us that the "corners" of the 2000 amos square box surrounding a city of the Levi'im are squared, so that the city gains more space at the corners (the diagonal — i.e., 2800 amos). The Gemara then inquires why R' Chanina ben Antigonus, who holds that the 2000 amos of Techum Shabbos are circular does not accept the derivation of corners from the cities of the Levi'im and derive that Techum Shabbos is squared.

In explaining the Gemara's question concerning R' Chanina ben Antigonus's position, Rashi, d.h. Pei'os notes: It is written "Corners" — As it is written (the southern) corner, and corner indicates squared. Although some later source emended Rashi and enclosed the southern in parentheses, clearly some version of Rashi did have the southern. The obvious question (that evidently led to the emendation) is, why does Rashi cite the words: the southern corner, while the Gemara itself cites the words the eastern corner?

Teshuvos Beis Efraim (end of Choshen Mishpat §64) in the name of R' Yitzchok HaLevi of Pressburg addresses this question.

In Pesachim (12b) the Gemara states that at noon, the sun is at "the corner." Rashi there explains that although in a circle there aren't four corners, but there can be two corners — i.e., if one divides a circle into two arcs, each arc "corner."

Accordingly, Rashi here means to prove that the corners in the context of the city of the Levi'im connote a square. How so? Had the verse just mentioned "corners," we could have understood it to refer to a circle, which can be described as having two corners, each 180 degrees apart from the other — either north and south or east and west. Hence, Rashi stresses that two of the corners mentioned are the one in the Gemara — east and the one he mentions — south. Thus, since the verse mentions corners that are only 90 degrees apart, perforce, it must be referring to a square.

We Compel People to Not Comport Themselves with the Trait of Sodom — Eruvin 49a

We Compel People to Not Comport Themselves with the Trait of Sodom — Eruvin 49a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף מט/א

ואמר רבה בר רב הונא אמר שמואל אם עירבה רגילה לעצמו וזה שאינה רגילה בו לא עירב והיא עצמה לא עירבה דוחין אותה אצל שאינה רגילה בו וכגון זה כופין על מדת סדום.

A person's house has access to two alleys, one that made an eruv and other that did not. He himself did not participate in the one alley's eruv. Were he to retain access to that alley, he would invalidate the eruv — due to his not having participated in it. The Gemara here tells us that we compel him to make use of the alley that did not make an eruv. The Gemara says that this is because he can use the other alley with no loss. Hence, he must use the other alley, rather than causing the one alley to lose its eruv. To have made use of the one alley and render its eruv invalid would be a Sodomite trait, as the Sodomites would refuse to allow others to make use of their possessions, even if it would cause them themselves no loss (see Avos 5:10).

Some fundamental principles of We Compel People to Not Comport Themselves with the Traits of Sodom:

1. We compel a person to not comport himself with the trait of Sodom — that is, in a case in which another person (or persons) will benefit from someone else's possession, and the owner will not suffer a loss, we compel the owner to allow the others to benefit. However, this is only the law in a case in which the owner is not deprived of even a potential benefit. If the owner is being deprived of a potential benefit, even if at the moment he is not availing himself of that benefit, we cannot compel himself to allow others to benefit from his possessions for free (Yad Malachi §306 from Mordechai, Bava Kama and Rema, Choshen Mishpat 363:6).
2. However, if there is no potential benefit of which the owner is being deprived, then we do compel him to not comport himself with the trait of Sodom, even if he will be caused to exert some extra effort, and even if it is possible that he may come to suffer a loss (Yad Malachi §332 from Mordechai loc. cit. and Hagahos Maimonios to the eleventh chapter of Hil. Gezeilah). [Hence, in our case, the person may be compelled to make use of the other alley even if his access through there is longer.]
3. We only compel the owner not to comport himself with the trait of Sodom if he is not using the possession in question at all. However, if he is making use of it, we cannot compel him to allow others to benefit from it for free at the same time (Yad Malachi §333 from Nimukei Yosef to Bava Kama; Maharshdam to Choshen Mishpat §446,464; R"E Sasson §129).

Finally, it is interesting to note that R' Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Kometz HaMinchah 1:31) writes that the principle that "Everything Hashem does is for the best" (Berachos 60b) is grounded in the principle that we compel a person to not comport himself with the trait of Sodom. For, just as a human being should allow others to benefit if he suffers no loss as a result, how much more so should Hashem allow people to benefit, since He suffers no loss as a result.

The Place of a Person — Eruvin 48a

The Place of a Person — Eruvin 48a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף מח/א

והני ארבע אמות היכא כתיבא כדתניא שבו איש תחתיו כתחתיו [וכמה תחתיו] גופו שלש אמות ואמה כדי לפשוט ידיו ורגליו דברי רבי מאיר רבי יהודה אומר גופו שלש אמות ואמה כדי שיטול חפץ מתחת מרגלותיו ומניח תחת מראשותיו

The Gemara derives from a pasuk that a person's place is four amos.

R' Tzadok HaKohen (Dover Tzedek, Kuntres Ner HaMitzvos, Mitzvas Aseh §1) notes that elsewhere (Berachos 8a) it is stated that from the time of the destruction of the Bais HaMikdash, Hashem has no place in the world other than the four amos of Halachah.

On the basis of our Gemara, Reb Tzadok explains that the place of Hashem is in the soul of a person who observes Halachah. Such souls are spiritual replicas of the Beis HaMikdash. This is indicated by the measure of four amos — the extent of a place of a person.

Reb Tzadok stresses that what is meant here is not the study of Halachah, but rather its observance. He continues on to note that elsewhere (Shabbos 5a) we learn that a person's hand is considered tantamount to a four amos by four amos place. Thus, we see that it is in a person's deeds that his place is determined.

Elsewhere (Pri Tzaddik to Tetzaveh §6), Reb Tzadok writes that Shemiras Shabbos — is Hashem's four amos of Halachah in this world — indicating that the four amos of Halachah are the four amos of Shabbos.

The Gemara in Berachos (25a) states that there must be four amos between a person who is davening and any excrement. Interestingly, the Rashba there writes that the reason why this is the measure of distance is because distancing from excrement is a part of the mitzvah of V'hayah machanecha kadosh (Devarim 23:15). Posits the Rashba: the personal machaneh of each person is four amos, and therefore he must distance himself accordingly so his personal machaneh will remain kadosh.

Yemos HaMoshiach and Gedarim — Eruvin 43b

Yemos HaMoshiach and Gedarim — Eruvin 43b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף מג/ב

סלקא דעתך מדאליהו לא אתא משיח נמי לא אתי במעלי שבתא לישתרי אליהו לא אתי משיח אתי דכיון דאתי משיחא הכל עבדים הן לישראל

The Gemara tells us that although Eliyahu HaNavi does not come on Erev Shabbos, Moshiach may come on a Friday. The Gemara explains that Eliyahu does not come because his coming will disrupt preparations for Shabbos. Moshiach's advent, on the other hand, will not be as disruptive, since when he comes the non-Jews will serve the Jews, and prepare for Shabbos for them.

The obvious question is, what about the cooking for Shabbos. How can the non-Jews cook for the Jews for Shabbos in view of the prohibition on Bishul Akum? And, what about the preparation of wine for Shabbos, in view of the prohibition on Stam Yeinam?

The Meshech Chochmah (to Shemos 12:22) notes that in Egypt, the Jews did not keep the mitzvos, but did keep the fences and barriers — they did not change their names, language and clothes. Conversely, in the Babylonian exile the Jews kept the Torah, but spoke the language of the land, changed their names, and married into the local populace.

Asserts the Meshech Chochmah, in Galus the fences and barriers are of primary importance, as a bulwark against assimilation. And it is for this reason that Chazal introduced prohibitions such as Bishul Akum and Stam Yeinam, so that even in Galus we might retain our national character and existence.

Hence, he explains, Chazal state that even Eliyahu HaNavi will not be allowed to cancel the eighteen decrees that are intended as fences and barriers (Avodah Zarah 36a). Even though he serves as the harbinger of Moshiach, when he comes the Galus is not yet at an end.

When Moshiach comes, however, the enticement for assimilation will no longer exist, as the nations will be subordinate to Am Yisroel. Hence, there will no longer be a need for the decrees that were intended as fences and barriers, and Hashem Himself may overrule them, allowing them to make the preparations of the first Shabbos of Yemos HaMashiach.

(See the Meshech Chochmah's statement there that with the advent of Moshiach and the rebuilding of the Beis HaMikdash, the ruling of R' Zeira that women who are niddos must wait five days before they begin counting their seven clean days [Berachos 31a] will also be nullified, for otherwise a woman will never know when to bring a sacrificial offering because she had been a zavah.)

Chisurei Mechasra — Eruvin 42a

Chisurei Mechasra — Eruvin 42a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף מב/א

וחסורי מחסרא והכי קתני

In the Introduction to the Pe'as HaShulchan, the author remarks about his Rebbe, the Gra, that his opinion was that any time that the Bavli interprets a mishnah with a chisurei mechasra — i.e., the introduction of "missing words" into the mishnah — in fact, the mishnah was not missing any words at all. Rather, R' Yehuda HaNasi, in his edition of the mishnah accepted the opinion of one Tanna, and edited the mishnah accordingly, and according to that Tanna, nothing whatsoever is missing. The Gemara, however, was inclined to accept the opinion of another Tanna, and added the missing words so as to reconstruct the mishnah accordingly.

Perhaps the Gra's assertion may serve to explain why the tool of chisurei mechasra is not employed by the Yerushalmi (Chomas Yerushalayim, Sha'ar §7).

The Shelah HaKadosh (Torah She'B'Al Peh, Klal §30), however, cites She'airis Yosef in the name of R' Matisyahu of France, who said that when the Gemara employs a chisurei mechasra there is nothing actually missing — as this would impute imperfection to the mishnah. Rather, R' Yehuda HaNasi found it necessary to make the mishnayos as terse as possible, and used the absolute minimum number of words possible while still making his meaning clear. A chisurei mechasra adds the words necessary for even the meanest intellect to comprehend the mishnah, but great scholars were always able to divine the meaning of the mishnah even without the additional words.

In a similar vein, notes the Shelah, the Ramban (Sefer HaBitachon) writes that there are many pesukim in Tanach in which we must add a word or two so as to understand the verse — but not because of any shortcoming in the text, but in a shortcoming of our appreciation of the language of the Scripture.

Teshuvos Melamed L'Ho'il (3:61), however, demonstrates that there are some places in which the chisure mechasra adds words which were not implicit in the original text of the mishnah, and that Rashi (Bava Metzia 114b) writes, concerning a chisurei mechasra there, that the Tanna forgot, missed and skipped several words.