Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer הרב יוסף גבריאל בקהופר
In my experience whenever I hold a Q&A session with a group of teens or college students, the question of downloading music, etc., is one of the first questions that will be raised. Moreover, even boys and men who in other issues are meticulous in their quest to act lifnim me'shuras ha'din (beyond the letter of the law), when it comes to this issue, they very much want to know the minimalist Halachic position – i.e., how much they can “get away with” and still technically be within the bounds of Jewish law.
Accordingly, let me begin by stating that from an ethical perspective, it behooves a Be en Torah who aspires to rise above mere technical compliance with Halacha, to refrain from any form of downloading which is questionable. Most of us – although we may deny this when we are in rationalization mode – know very well when what we are doing falls into that gray area. If you are still unsure as to the definition of this category, by all means consult one of your Rabbeim.
Returning, however, to the question of the minimalist Halachic position in this area, Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef shlita (the son of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef shlita) refers to the Gemara in Bava Metzia (24a-b) that discusses an object that was swept away by a tidal wave (zuto shel yam). In that case, we regard the object as a lot item whose owner has given up all hope of retrieval (l'achar yei'ush). This is the case even if the owner watching the tidal wave sweep away his possession declares and affirms that he is not giving up the hope of retrieving his object. Under the circumstances, his declaration is meaningless, as the hope of retrieval is regarded as little more than a fantasy.
Any music that is freely and widely available on the web falls into this category. Any hope that the owner may have of retaining or retrieving his intellectual property is futile and meaningless. Hence, one would be permitted to download such music for personal use.
Please note that this is not carte blanche. This logic will not permit:
Uploading music to such sites.
Copying from CDs or DVDs.
Selling the downloaded music to others or sharing it with people who cannot access it themselves over the Internet.
Downloading music from hacking sites.
בס"ד
בענין ע"א נאמן באיסורים, גיטין ד"ב ע"ב
דוד ווייס, עם הוספות מאת בעמח"ס בגדי שש
Three way machlokes in Sukkah, 34b:
משנה: רבי ישמעאל אומר שלשה הדסים ושתי ערבות לולב אחד ואתרוג אחד אפילו שנים קטומים ואחד אינו קטום רבי טרפון אומר אפילו שלשתן קטומים רבי עקיבא אומר כשם שלולב אחד ואתרוג אחד כך הדס אחד וערבה אחת: גמרא: תניא רבי ישמעאל אומר פרי עץ הדר אחד כפת תמרים אחד ענף עץ עבת שלשה ערבי נחל שתים ואפילו שנים קטומים ואחד שאינו קטום רבי טרפון אומר שלשה ואפילו שלשתן קטומים רבי עקיבא אומר כשם שלולב אחד ואתרוג אחד כך הדס אחד וערבה אחת אמר לו רבי אליעזר יכול יהא אתרוג עמהן באגודה אחת אמרת וכי נאמר פרי עץ הדר וכפת תמרים והלא לא נאמר אלא כפת ומנין שמעכבין זה את זה תלמוד לומר ולקחתם שתהא לקיחה תמה ורבי ישמעאל מה נפשך אי שלימין בעי ליבעי נמי כולהו אי לא בעי שלימין אפילו חד נמי לא אמר ביראה אמר רבי אמי חזר בו רבי ישמעאל אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כרבי טרפון ואזדא שמואל לטעמיה דאמר להו שמואל להנהו דמזבני אסא אשוו וזבינו ואי לא דרישנא לכו כרבי טרפון מאי טעמא אילימא משום דמיקל ולידרוש להו כרבי עקיבא דמיקל טפי תלתא קטומי שכיחי חד ולא קטום לא שכיח.
Shmuel threatened to paskin like R' Tarfon if the sellers didn’t lower their prices. But how could he change the halacha just because he was upset at the price? Tosfaos say it was merely a threat, but other Rishonim that take Shmuel literally.
The Chelkas Yoav asks, since a rav is an eid echad, and an eid echad is not believed in a case of eeschazeik, how can a rav ever paskin against eezchasek [both l'kula and l'chumra]? The Chelkas Yoav doesn’t address Shmuel's threat, but we can apply the question here: How can Shmuel, as an eid echad go against the eezchasek that the halacha is according to R' Yishmael?
There is a general, global question as to the status of an eid echad vs. rov or chazaka (discussed by the Shev Shmytsa and Shaarei Yosher).
Another general, global question is what is the nature of eid echad ne’eman b’eesurim? Is it a birrur or an hanhaga (this is discussed by the Rogatchover, and the Maitchiter Illui)? If it’s a birrur, then it's mevarer the reality. It tells us what the thing actually is. If it's an hanhaga, it just tells us the law: I.e., you just rely on the eid echad to tell you what to do even though he has no impact on the ascertaining the reality.
A chazaka tells us what to do when we have a safek. It doesn’t tell us what the metzius actually is, it just tells us how to conduct ourselves. It is an hanhaga. Generally speaking, rov is also an hanhaga (although a rubba d'leisa kamman can be a birrur). However, explains Reb Shimon (heard by RYGB from R' Yisroel Zev Gustman zt”l), these two hanhagos can never be relevant simultaneously: A chazaka is an hanhaga we were given to use in cases in which we have a balanced safek. A rov is an hanhaga that by definition indicates an imbalanced safek. They are thus mutually exclusive. (This is the omek ha'pshat in rov adif me'chazaka).
However, explains Reb Shimon, eid echad is a birrur. I.e., the eid is believed to tell us that there is no safek! Therefore, eid echad adif over both chazaka and rov: Since the safek has been eliminated via the birrur, there is no need nor room to apply hanhagos.
Now let us address eeschazeik. Eeschazeik is the equivalent of an Anan Sahadei: I.e., “we are the witnesses.” An Anan Sahadei is an assumption so strong that in serves in lieu of witnesses. [A famous example is the case of a nonreligious husband and wife who had a civil ceremony, do we say that an Anan Sahadei, that we know that they want to be married, operates in lieu of eidim? (This was a big machlokes between Reb Moshe Feinstein and Rav Henkin).]
In terms of birrurim, an Anan Sahadei is considered the equivalent of two witnesses. It’s therefore a superior form of birrur to an eid echad. So what does b'yado do? b'yado means, that which you assumed to be the reality, is not necessarily the case. Rav Amiel says that there's a difference between yesod u'binyan (foundation and building) vs. seeba u'mesuvav (cause and effect). An example of yesod u'binyan is the meego of, “Believe me, for if I wanted to lie I could've lied a better lie.” That’s a yesod u'binyan: If I don’t have the second lie at my disposal right now, then the concept of having a better lie does not exist. Here we apply the seeba u'mesuvav approach: if a chicken is dead, we can't schecht it again, but the fact that I could've schechted it yesterday means that I was the master of the situation. This would not work under the approach of yesod u'binyan, as in that approach if the foundation no longer exists the structure falls. But under the cause and effect approach, once the cause did exist at one point, even if it no longer does,the effect continues to be operative. Thus, since I could've schechted the chicken yesterday (the cause), I continue to be believed against eeschazek (effect).
This is the meaning of b'yado: Since at some point, I possessed mastery over the status of a thing, and had the capacity to halachically manipulate it, I continue to possess the capacity to clarify to you that your Anan Sahadei was based on a mistake.
How halacha works:
ירושלמי סנהדרין כ”א ע”א-ב: א"ר ינאי אילו ניתנה התורה חתוכה לא היתה לרגל עמידה. מה טעם וידבר ה' אל משה אמר לפניו רבונו של עולם הודיעני היאך היא ההלכה אמר לו אחרי רבים להטות רבו המזכין זכו רבו המחייבין חייבו כדי שתהא התורה נדרשת מ"ט פנים טמא ומ"ט פנים טהור מיניין ודגל"ו. וכן הוא אומר אמרות ה' אמרות טהורות כסף צרוף בעליל לארץ מזוקק שבעתים ואומר מישרים אהבוך.
רבנו חננאל סנהדרין ל"ו ע"א: א"ר ינאי אילו ניתנה תורה חתוכה לא היתה עמידה לרגל מאי טעמא וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר אמר לפניו רבון כל העולמים הודיעני היאך היא הלכה א"ל אחרי רבים להטות. רבו המזכים זכאי. רבו המחייבים חייב כדי שתהא התורה נדרשת מ"ט פנים טמא ומ"ט פנים טהור מנין ודגלו וכן הוא אומר אמרות ה' אמרות טהורות כסף צרוף בעליל לארץ מזוקק שבעתים ואמר מישרים אהבוך. א"ר יוחנן כל מי שאינו יודע לדון את השרץ לטמאו מאה פעמים ולטהרו מאה פעמים אינו יכול לפתוח בזכות. תלמיד ותיק היה לרבי והיה מטהר ומטמא השרץ מאה פעמים. אמרי ההוא תלמיד קטוע מטורא דסיני הוה.
ריטב"א עירובין י"ג ע"ב: שם אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים שאלו רבני צרפת ז"ל האיך אפשר שיהו אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים וזה אוסר וזה מתיר ותרצו כי כשעלה משה למרום לקבל התורה הראו לו על כל דבר ודבר מ"ט פנים לאיסור ומ"ט פנים להיתר ושאל להקב"ה על זה ואמר שיהא זה מסור לחכמי ישראל שבכל דור ודור ויהיה הכרעה כמותם ונכון הוא לפי הדרש ובדרך האמת יש טעם סוד בדבר.
Hashem thus says that’s its up to the Chachamei HaDor of each generation to decide which logic is most applicable. [It doesn’t meant that someone from a later generation can come up with a different perspective, but he often can determine between preexisting multiple perspectives. Fore example, nobody in this generation can say the halacha is not according to the Shulcahn Aruch, but poskim today can still paskin against later poskim.] So if your rav says something, you follow what he says. Thus, halacha is effectively in “his hand” - b'yado.
So in the case of Shmuel, it was b'yado, to go back to any legitimate Tannaic position. Meaning that Shmuel, as the posek of Neharda'a, who lived in first generation of Amoraim, had the capacity to choose among the three legitimate opinions. (Although he couldn't sustain his own personal opinion against the Tannaim, because Amoraim cant argue with Tana'im.)
In our Gemara, Rashi evidently holds that eid echad is a birrur while Tosafos hold that eid echad is an hanhaga.
In the case of a sotah, Tosafos evidently hold that eid echad is an hanhaga, while Rambam holds eid echad is a birrur. So in a case in which she drank and did not die, and then an eid echad testifies that she was mezaneh, according to Tosafos the eid echad is accepted, while according to Rambam the eid echad is rejected. For if you hold that eid echad is an hanhaga, while the water is a birrur, they do not clash, and we default to the principle that the birur of the water is only effective in the absence of an alternative manner of clarification. However, if an eid echad is also a birrur, they do clash, and we cannot simply default to relying on the eid echad. On the contrary, the water, being a miraculous procedure, would be a better birrur than eid echad. [The question is why, if she drank the water and came out alive, even according to Rambam two subsequent witnesess supersede the water. RYGB initially explained that this is because two witnesses are a better form of birrur. At the time of this writing, however, he tends to think that it is because two witnesses have tzvei dinim: both a din of birrur and a din of hanhaga that they supersede the water.]
Back to our Gemara: Tosafos complain that Rashi shouldn't have thrown in terumah and schechita with other examples of eid echad, since these are cases of eeschazeik issura in which the eid echad is only believed on account of b'yado.
It seems that according to Rashi in a case of eeschazek b'yado, the ne’emanus is that of eid echad; while according to Tosafos in a case of eeschazek with an eid echad, the ne’emanus is that of b'yado.
Tosafos continue: How am I ever supposed to trust woman on schechting??? Tosafos extend b'yado to say that perhaps she can learn how to schecht, or can hire others. Evidently, Tosafos have to employ b'yado much more l'ma'aseh than Rashi.
Rashi says eid echad is logic; you assume the food you eat at someone's house is kosher. Tosafos say we learn from a gezeiras hakasuv from a woman who was a needah. According to Maharsha, the derivation is as follows: In the case of needah there are two issues: 1. Her seeing blood; 2. Her becoming tahor. Say Tosafos: She's not eeschazek issura in terms of seeing blood because she naturally cycles back and forth in seeing and not seeing it. She is, however, eeschazek issura in terms of being tamei until she goes to a mikveh. On the other hand, it is not b'yada to stop her bleeding, while it is b'yada to go to a mikveh. We thus derive from needah both that an eid echad is accepted when lo eeschazek issura (in regard to her seeing blood) even if it is not b'yado, and that an eid echad is accepted when eeschazek issura (in regard to her becoming tahor) if it is b'yado.
Review: Tosafos' point that Rashi shouldn't have thrown terumah and shechita together with other forms of eid echad is l'shitasam that this is a different type of ne'emanus derived from the second aspect of needah, as opposed to the other forms of eid echad that are derived from the first aspect of needah. Moreover, according to Tosafos, both types of eid echad are hanhagos, and are only effective because of the Gezeiros HaKasuv. Furthermore, since b'yado is the basis of the ne'emanus when eeschazek issura, it must be very much l'ma'aseh – viz., that she could've learned the halachos of schechita or hired someone.
But according to Rashi, eid echad is a sevara, and the eidus is always in itself the basis of the ne'emanus. It is just that sometimes you need b'yado to eliminate eeschazek issura so that it is not a case of two witnesses (Anan Sahadei) against one. To eliminate the Anan Sahadei even a very theoretical mastery suffices, so the b'yado does not need to be as l'ma'aseh.
It is very funny and sad, that when people's opinion differ there is what I call random categorization that happens. For some reason people have a need of labeling other people? Your a left wing and I am a right or you are Haredi and I am not, Ultra Orthodox and modern.
All what these labels and categorization do is separate and distance people to the point that each has to go to his own shul, and live in a different community, and has his own shulchan aruch.
I often wonder when 600,000 Jews received the Torah did they all started labeling each other.
Did 600,000 Jews with 600,000 opinions started separating from each other due their hashkafas. Did say you are lefty (therefore wrong) and I am righty (therefore right).
Why is there a need to label different Jews? Why does disagreeing with another Jew we feel a need to separate ourselves. Do people honestly believe that calling somebody a liberal or a modern Jew makes you go to Heaven because you are more strict on Judaism while for whatever reason you give yourselves a Heter to say Loshan Hara about a group of Jews.
Anyway a person spins it, whenever he refers to a somebody as a lefty or a modern he has a negative connotation when he uses that term. He treats them differently and speaks to them differently, and I know we all think we are tzaddikim that we have only the most holy thouhgts in mind when say this but the bottom when we label somebody, we try to distance ourself, and inferiorize them.
On a more serious note a very interesting thing I read on exile of Jews from Spain, that may clarify what I am saying.
הגרי"ש אלישיב "אין לסמוך על תשובותי בעל פה"
שמעתי מפי עדים נאמנים ששמעו מחתנו של הרב אלישיב הגאון רבי עזריאל אויערבך שאמר להרב גלבר בעל האורחות שבת שלא יכתוב בספר אורחות שבת פסקים ששמע בע"פ מהגרי"ש אלישיב בשנים האחרונות.
ר' עזריאל נימק ואמר כי הרב אלישיב אמר לו שלא לסמוך להלכה למעשה על השאלות שנשאל בשנים האחרונות בעל פה (רק מה שבכתב), וזאת בגלל שהרב אלישיב אמר לו שמשיב לשואלים מה שנראה לו מסברה (הם הרי שואלים מה נראה לי נימק) ולא מתוך ידיעה ולכן לא לסמוך על הדברים הלכה למעשה.
עם זאת ציין כי השאלות שנשאל בעל פה בשנים מוקדמות יותר ניתן לסמוך גם הלכה למעשה, מה שאין כן בשנים האחרונות בהם הגרי"ש חלש יותר.
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