Both This and That? — Eruvin 91a

Both This and That? — Eruvin 91a

(1) תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף צא/א

רבי שמעון אומר אחד גגין וכו': אמר רב הלכה כרבי שמעון והוא שלא עירבו אבל עירבו לא דגזרינן דילמא אתי לאפוקי מאני דבתים לחצר ושמואל אמר בין עירבו בין שלא עירבו וכן אמר רבי יוחנן מי לחשך בין עירבו ובין שלא עירבו מתקיף לה רב חסדא לשמואל ולרבי יוחנן יאמרו שני כלים בחצר אחת זה מותר וזה אסור רבי שמעון לטעמיה דלא גזר

R' Chisda here expresses astonishment that both Shmuel and R' Yochanan should allow an inconsistency in Halachah that might lead to confusion: If you allow the transfer from yard to yard of both objects that originated in a house (that participated in the eruv of the one yard) and objects that originated from the yard itself (of a house that did not participate in an eruv), people will come to question: This one object may be transferred (from yard to yard), and this object may not be transferred?

A similar discussion appears in Gittin (18a), where Shmuel says that the three month period that a divorced woman must wait before remarrying begins from the date her get was written, not from the date that it was written. Here, R' Nosson bar Oshiya expresses astonishment: If you allow the remarriage to take place three months after the date on which the get was written, people will come to question: Two women divorced by the same man on the same day, one is permitted to remarry earlier and one later (depending on the dates of their gittin)?

Why does this question of consistency not seem to bother Shmuel specifically? Perhaps we can find a clue on the basis of the twin principles that halachah in monetary issues follows Shmuel and that halachah in monetary issues follows R' Nachman. We see in Bava Basra 143a that in a case in which one person says to another: "Acquire, you and the donkey together," R' Nachman rules — and the halachah hence is — that the person acquires half of the entity in question. But will not people come to question: The acquisition by the donkey is meaningless, yet the acquisition by the person is effective?

Evidently, dayanim like Shmuel and R' Nachman felt that Halachah must be precise, regardless of the impression that might be left in the process (see Gilyonei HaShas here and Teshuvos Yabi'a Omer, vol. 6, Even HaEzer 2:2).

My Brother in Law, Rabbi Chaim Brown's New Blog

http://divreichaim.blogspot.com/

Pi Tikra — Eruvin 90b

Pi Tikra — Eruvin 90b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף צ/ב

פי תקרה יורד וסותם

From The Contemporary Eruv:

In 1952, Rabbi Raphael Ber Weissmandel wrote a proposal to permit carrying on Shabbos in Brooklyn on the basis of the elevated train lines. His rationale, however, was not based on the principle of tzuras ha'pesach, but on that of “pi tikra yored v'sosem” (literally: the lip of a roof comes down and closes). The principle, as defined in the Shulchan Aruch (361:2) is that, when a roof is at least four tefachim by four tefachim and set atop two complete walls, we view the thickness of the roof as an imaginary wall for the remaining two sides.² Rabbi Moshe Feinstein disagreed with Rabbi Weissmandel's application of this principle to elevated train lines (Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:138). Among his reasons was his observation that several Rishonim do not view the principle of pi tikra as creating walls, but as creating a defined area (underneath the ceiling) in which one is allowed to carry. Thus, perhaps one might be permitted to carry directly underneath the elevated tracks, but the tracks could still not serve to enclose the area that they enclose.

The Tikvas Zecharia (Rabbi Zecharia Rosenfeld, first Chief Rabbi of St. Louis, MO) notes that telegraph poles often support a thicket of wires at their tops. These wires are well within three tefachim of each other. Viewing them, halachically, as connected, allows one to consider the thicket as a roof. One could then apply the principle of pi tikra yored v’sosem to them. In practice, however, Rabbi Rosenfeld does not utilize this approach in sanctioning the use of the telegraph poles and wires as halachic walls, preferring instead the already accepted trend to view them as comprising tzuros ha'pesach. He does, however, propose that the presence of these “roofs” along the length of a street will diminish their potential to be regarded as a reshus ha'rabbim, since roofed over reshuyos ha'rabbim are automatically downgraded to carmelis status. - see Nesivos Shabbos 3:1 and note 6, where he considers (inconclusively) how much of a roof is necessary to negate a reshus ha'rabbim.

Caused Melachah: Coloring Water with a Disinfectant — Eruvin 88a

Caused Melachah: Coloring Water with a Disinfectant — Eruvin 88a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פח/א

אמר רבה בר רב הונא לא שנו אלא למלאות אבל לשפוך אסור

The Gemara in Shabbos (100b and 141a) rules that it is permitted to cause an object to move in a carmelis (כוחו בכרמלית לא גזרו רבנן). Tosafos (here, and to Shabbos 100b d.h. Cocho) finds this ruling in evident contradiction to our Gemara's statements that it is not permitted to spill water from a balcony into the sea because in doing so one causes the water to move more than four amos. Since the sea is a carmelis it seems evident that our Gemara holds that it is forbidden to cause an object to move four amos in a carmelis!? The Tosafos resolve the contradiction by distinguishing between a balcony, which occasionally abuts a reshus ha'rabbim — where, therefore, the Rabbis forbade כוחו בכרמלית — and a boat at sea (the topic of the discussion in Shabbos), which never abuts a reshus ha'rabbim — where, therefore, the Rabbis allow כוחו בכרמלית.

In the final analysis, we see that כוחו בכרמלית is not always permitted. In a novel comparison, R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvos Minchas Shlomo, Tinyana §33) relates this issue to the question of using a disinfectant that colors the water in a toilet. R' Shlomo Zalman notes that the water that is colored by the initial gush of water upon flushing cannot be considered caused to become colored, but colored by direct action. However, writes R' Shlomo Zalman, even the coloring of the water subsequent to the initial gush, which the person flushing the toilet is only causing, may not be permitted, as we see here that not in all cases do the Rabbis permit causing a prohibited activities — even ones, like moving objects in a carmelis or coloring water, that are at worst rabbinic prohibitions.

Utility Boxes and Bridges — Eruvin 89a

Utility Boxes and Bridges — Eruvin 89a

תוספות עירובין דף פט/א

במחיצות שאינן ניכרות - כשהבתים מחוברין דאין מחיצות הבתים ניכרות כדפירש בקונטרס ונראה דהוא הדין אם הגג בולט חוץ למחיצות הבית דחשיב נמי מחיצות שאינן ניכרות

From The Contemporary Eruv:

Many problems may arise when gud asek lechayayim (short rods or sticks attached to the side of a telephone pole) are used. Often a utility company box may be attached to the utility pole between the lechi and the overhead cable. If the lechi is built all the way up to the box, or to within three tefachim of it, then the box may be considered part of the lechi. The halachic mechanism of “lavud” connects them. If, however, the lechi ends more than three tefachim beneath the box, then the box interrupts the gud asek (Mishnah Berurah 363:112 based on the Taz there se'if katan 19. The scenario discussed there concerns a roof positioned between the lechi and the overhead cable, but it seems that the same Halacha applies to this case). Just as in our case the roof "overrides" the walls underneath, the utility box overrides the lechi.

Due to this, and other considerations, “state of the art” eruvin do not utilize gud asek lechayayim, but, rather, build the lechayayim all the way up to the overhead cable. No imaginary lines need then be drawn, as an actual structure extends all the way to the wire.

Moreover, it is generally accepted that walls underneath a bridge - even artificial walls - are not meaningful vis-á-vis the bridge itself, as the bridge overrides the walls, and that whatever rectification is ultimately required must be mounted above and across the bridge’s roadway. The nature of that rectification is contingent on whether the bridge is or serves an area classified as a reshus ha'rabbim (in which case delasos are required) or a carmelis (in which case a tzuras ha'pesach is required). See the discussion in this regard in the Chazon Ish, siman 108; Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim, 1:139:1; and, No’am, ibid., pp. 224-228. See the discussions in No’am there as to: a) whether extant structures on the bridges may be considered halachically valid tzuros ha'pesach; and, b) whether drawbridges require an additional rectification.

Delayed Melachah — Eruvin 88a

Delayed Melachah — Eruvin 88a

רש"י עירובין דף פח/א

שופכין לתוכו - דתיימי מיא, ואי נמי לא תיימי, דיש בו מים מבעוד יום, כיון דרוב ימות השנה עשוין ליבלע הכי נמי כי נפקי לבראי לאו להכי איכוון, וכיון דלא נתקיימה מחשבתו שרי דאפילו מתכוין לאו איסורא דאורייתא איכא הכא, דהא לאו ברשות הרבים זריק להו איהו גופיה, אלא מאיליהן יוצאין הלכך כי לא מיכוין שרי לכתחלה:

The Eglei Tal (fol. 84b) writes that a person who places grain in a mill that runs on water power is only liable (by Torah law) for the grain that is ground in the first turn of the water wheel. The grain that is ground in the second turn of the wheel is considered only a grama — caused by the person, but not performed by him. Hence, there is no Torah prohibition involved.

The Eglei Tal proves this point from Rashi here, who writes that a person who water spills water in a reshus ha'yachid deliberately intending the water to flow into a reshus ha'rabbim does not violate a Torah prohibition.

R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvos Minchas Shlomo, Tinyana 31:3) questions the comparison: Perhaps it is only in the case of Hotza'ah, which is defined as a Melachah Geru'a (lit., "a deficient melachah") — viz., one in which the object that is the subject of the melachah is not changed in any way. Perhaps it is specifically because of its "deficiency" that it is necessary for a person to actively remove the object from domain to domain. On the other hand, in the case of any other melachah, perhaps setting the melachah in motion suffices to render one in violation of a Torah prohibition — even, in the case of the water mill, for the second turn of the wheel.

In fact, in regard to wind mill, the Eglei Tak writes that even if the person placed the grain in the mill at a time in which no wind was blowing, but later the wind began blowing and ground the grain, that the question of whether the person violated a Torah prohibition is the subject of a dispute among the Rishonim.

Hence, in the final analysis, R' Shlomo Zalman at the end of his teshuvah, forbids placing a milking machine on a cow's udders while it is "off," if it is set to go on afterwards.

Delayed Melachah — Eruvin 88a

רש"י עירובין דף פח/א

שופכין לתוכו - דתיימי מיא, ואי נמי לא תיימי, דיש בו מים מבעוד יום, כיון דרוב ימות השנה עשוין ליבלע הכי נמי כי נפקי לבראי לאו להכי איכוון, וכיון דלא נתקיימה מחשבתו שרי דאפילו מתכוין לאו איסורא דאורייתא איכא הכא, דהא לאו ברשות הרבים זריק להו איהו גופיה, אלא מאיליהן יוצאין הלכך כי לא מיכוין שרי לכתחלה:

The Eglei Tal (fol. 84b) writes that a person who places grain in a mill that runs on water power is only liable (by Torah law) for the grain that is ground in the first turn of the water wheel. The grain that is ground in the second turn of the wheel is considered only a grama — caused by the person, but not performed by him. Hence, there is no Torah prohibition involved.

The Eglei Tal proves this point from Rashi here, who writes that a person who water spills water in a reshus ha'yachid deliberately intending the water to flow into a reshus ha'rabbim does not violate a Torah prohibition.

R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (Teshuvos Minchas Shlomo, Tinyana 31:3) questions the comparison: Perhaps it is only in the case of Hotza'ah, which is defined as a Melachah Geru'a (lit., "a deficient melachah") — viz., one in which the object that is the subject of the melachah is not changed in any way. Perhaps it is specifically because of its "deficiency" that it is necessary for a person to actively remove the object from domain to domain. On the other hand, in the case of any other melachah, perhaps setting the melachah in motion suffices to render one in violation of a Torah prohibition — even, in the case of the water mill, for the second turn of the wheel.

In fact, in regard to wind mill, the Eglei Tak writes that even if the person placed the grain in the mill at a time in which no wind was blowing, but later the wind began blowing and ground the grain, that the question of whether the person violated a Torah prohibition is the subject of a dispute among the Rishonim.

Hence, in the final analysis, R' Shlomo Zalman at the end of his teshuvah, forbids placing a milking machine on a cow's udders while it is "off," if it is set to go on afterwards.

Sea Walls — Eruvin 87a

Sea Walls — Eruvin 87a


תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פז/א
בימה של טבריא הואיל ויש לה אוגנים


רש"י עירובין דף פז/א
אוגנים - שפה גבוה דהויא כמחיצות סביב לה, דאיכא קצת הכירא דהיתר, דהא כרמלית מדרבנן היא, גזרה משום הוצאה מרשות היחיד לרשות הרבים, הואיל ויש לה קצת היתר, ואף על גב דאכתי כרמלית היא דהא קרפף יותר מבית סאתים שלא הוקף לדירה הוא, מיהו בתקנתא פורתא כי הא סגי:

From The Contemporary Eruv:
In the last decade of the seventeenth century, we find the Chacham Tzvi (§5 and §37) addressing the possibility that natural walls, such as the canals surrounding The Hague in Holland, or even the cliffs surrounding the entire British isle, might constitute an eruv. While he rejected the latter possibility, he did accept the former possibility.

An issue concerning the use of lake/seashores or river/canal banks, raised by the Rama (Orach Chaim 363:29), is that even where the shores or banks are sufficiently steep to form a halachic wall when the eruv is first put into effect, they may later be obliterated by a build-up of sediment. There was also concern that the river may freeze. Where, however, the wall above the highest tide is sufficient to meet the minimum standards, neither of these two concerns would impede upon the incorporation of the banks in an eruv (Mishna Berura 363:121). The Tikvas Zecharia (pp. 14-22) maintains - and musters significant evidence to support his position - that the concern over build-up of sediment is only a problem when parts of the shore or bank comprising the halachic wall are at or near the water line. Where, however, the entire portion of the shore or bank comprising the halachic wall is safely above the water line, the concern is not relevant and need not be taken into account. This is the prevalent view - see Mishna Berura, ibid. and Nesivos Shabbos 15:10 and note 25. The Mishna Berura also notes that most sources raise the concern of sediment only when discussing seashores, not riverbanks. In discussing riverbanks, however, they are concerned only with freezing. A great river such as the Mississippi, however, may be more similar in these respects to a sea (although the Tikvas Zecharia, p. 56, does not entertain that possibility). (There were Poskim who permitted one side of an eruv to consist of a seashore or riverbank, if the other three were bona fide walls or tzuros ha'pesach - see No’am, ibid., pp. 214-217, and Nesivos Shabbos, ibid.) We should note that the eruv in Manhattan did include banks and shores that were not of sufficient halachic height above the waterline, and that other rationales were necessary to allow leniency there. See No’am, ibid., pp. 213-217. See also Hilchos Eruvin by Rabbi Elimelech Lange (Yerushalayim, 1972) 3:8-12.

Chanukah: Another Newsletter Essay

Extracurricular Talmud Enrichment II

This past week, one of the וואס איז דער חילוק – What is the Distinction issues we discussed was the following question:

At times and in places in which Chanukah candles are lit out of doors, they are placed at the entrance to one's courtyard. The halachah is that a person who has two entrances to his courtyard on different sides of his house must light candles at each of the entrances. He must do this lest a person who passes on one side of the house — not knowing that the owner lit on the other side of the house — might suspect that the owner of this house does not fulfill the obligation of lighting candles.

On the other hand, if candles were inadvertently extinguished shortly after lighting, they need not be lit again (כבתה אין זקוק לה). This is the case even if they had not yet burned the requisite half hour, so long as the original amount of fuel could have sufficed for that time.

Why in the latter case didn't Chazal require the person whose candles went out to re-light them lest people come to suspect that he is not lighting at all? וואס איז דער חילוק – why in the case of two entrances were Chazal concerned with suspicion, but not in the case of the candles that went out?

Several talmidim (including Eitan Fine and Yehoshua Bloom) answered along the same lines as does Rav Scheinberg shlita: Chazal might expand your fulfillment of a obligation, but they did not make you repeat a obligation. In the former case, due to the suspicion factor, Chazal decreed that at the time that you are lighting your primary candles — at the time you are fulfilling the obligation — you should expand that act to include all the entrances to your courtyard. In the latter case, however, you have already fulfilled the obligation — with your initial lighting. Chazal do not make you repeat an obligation in order to avoid suspicion.

Two talmidim (Mordechai Chevinsky and Yehuda Popack) gave a novel answer that I think might even be better than the one given by Rav Scheinberg: In the latter case, where the candles went out, it is true that this evening passersby will not see that you have lit candles (as would also be the case if they came after the half hour elapsed). But they will see the candles when they pass by on any other evening of Chanukah. Hence, Chazal did not need to make you re-light the candles to avoid suspicion. On the other hand, in the former case, it is possible that the passersby on one side of your house will continue, night after night, to pass by on the same side, never going out of their way to see the other side, where the candles were lit. Hence, it was necessary for Chazal to obligate you to light on all sides of your house, so as to avoid suspicion.

Finally, Yoni Rozenberg suggested that the reason Chazal did not require you to re-light candles that became extinguished because they were afraid you might come to do so on the evening of Chanukah that falls on Erev Shabbat, and perhaps light a little too late, thus being mechalel Shabbat.

Wealth — Eruvin 86a

Wealth — Eruvin 86a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פו/א

רבי מכבד עשירים רבי עקיבא מכבד עשירים

It is obviously difficult to understand why R' Yehuda HaNasi and R' Akiva would give honor to wealthy people. Could it be that they honored wealthy individuals merely because of their wealth?!

Teshuvos HaGeonim (Musafia-Lik §2) explains that there is a category, separate and distinct from a Talmid Chacham, of a Ba'al Ma'asim, a person who gives Tzedakah and involves himself in communal needs graciously, and who possesses stellar character traits. Such people deserve respect even if they lack wisdom. Indeed, if they are Yi'ri'ei Cheit, they are superior to Talmidei Chachamim (see Shabbos 31b). It was this type of wealthy individual that Rebbe respected.

Maharil (Minhagim, Likutim §35) in the name of Maharam Segal explains that since R' Yehuda HaNasi was very wealthy, he accustomed himself to give honor to other wealthy individuals so that people would honor him for his riches as well, and not for his Torah wisdom, as he did not want to make the crown of Torah a diadem with which to enhance his prestige (R' Akiva honored the rich for the same reason).

The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (29:3) explains that the reason to give honor to the wealthy is not because they necessarily deserve it, but as an exercise in humility: One should always strive to identify an aspect in which one's fellow man may be superior to oneself. In the case of a rich person, even if he lacks any other redeeming quality, one should be dan l'kaf zechus that he must have some superior merit for which riches were bestowed upon him.

[For other explanations, see Chasam Sofer to Gittin 59a d.h. Bunis ben Nunis, and the two different explanations given by R' Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin, in Pri Tzaddik to Matos §13 and in Likkutei Ma'amarim §16 d.h. Al Kein Amru Zal (Menachos 29a).]

Post from my friend Reb Aaron Berger

From my friend Reb Aaron: You can post responses as comments or email me for his address.

How does one maintain emuna in spite of all the corruption out there among frum society and its leaders? (By corruption, I am not referring to dramatic lack of integrity, as in lying, cheating, znus, etc. I think this exists, but is the exception. I refer to the absence of authenticity; i.e. the agenda, the cheshbonos, the apparent lack of running life decisions through the filter of rotzon hashem, etc.; the sum of which detract from the emes and shleimus of our religion, and therefore corrupt it). If you don't agree with my basic premise that there is such corruption going on, then we can agree to disagree. I do not care to argue that point. It is more than obvious to me.

When I face up to all this nonsense, at first it makes me wonder about the integrity of the mesorah handed down to me. Is all the trust that I had placed in that which was handed down from e.g. the Chazon Ish, the Chofetz Chaim, etc. misplaced? Is it possible that all these gedolim were really not that great but their image was bolstered by clever promoters? These doubts do not usually linger too long. I know enough products of these gedolim to restore my confidence. So I typically regain my bearings pretty quickly and my shaila becomes more focused. I wonder where the real leaders are that hashem must have (I had always thought) put here for us. My assumption had always been that every dor has its trusted leaders. If ours does not, how can we push forward our mesorah to the next generation. Can we exist as a believing nation without a set of trusted leaders?

My chizuk usually ends up coming from isolated events of integrity and righteousness which do exist among our rabbonim, great and small. What gets me, though, is that these are the exception rather than the norm. If a rav acts like a mentch, it is considered worthy of recording in an Artscroll biography. (look at some of the nonsense that gets recorded as acts of tzidkus). Why shouldn't we be able to hold our rabbis to the same standards of integrity that we hold ourselves?? If our religion can't foster the basic decency that is a given in other religions, what is it worth?? And even when there is no outright breach of integrity, there is almost always an agenda of some sort such as recruiting students, gathering $, or even influencing people to keep a particular brand of frumkeit. What happened to actually believing in g-d?? What happened to making believe we actually believe in g-d, and following through on all that that implies?? What happened to the simple "kiruv" work that our grandfathers did by welcoming another yid into their circle, without any agenda other than brotherhood and humanity??

I tend to think the real answer is that emuna comes from a place very deep in a person and it does not derive from leaders. It simply cannot afford to. It comes from our families; from a time before the whole daas torah rage, from a time when being frum was something deep in your genetics and did not depend on constant direction from "gedolim". It derives from the mesorah based on what all 600,000 of our parents saw; thus its transmission involves the whole klal, not just the leaders. This very basic, very real, very pious frumkeit (seems ridiculous to have to put the word pious before frumkeit) is what I observed in, and received from, my grandparents. They all had deep respect for rabbonim. But they did not appear to be deriving their whole belief system from the rabbis in the same obsessive manner that frum jews are doing today. If a rav did mess up it didn't shake their whole world because they understood that he failed as a man and that the religion itself is much greater than any one man. I remember remarking to a chaver in yeshiva that with all the rabbeim I had, all of whom were "good guys", I never met anyone as frum as my grandfather. To me he seemed to have the real stuff. No razzle dazzle, no frumeh cheshbonos, no nonsense. This emuna that I saw in all my grandparents had been injected very deep into their psyches by observing their own parents and grandparents, and was collective in the klal. I need to believe that we, as a dor, can push through without a reliable system of trusted leaders, based on the emuna that lives in the klal.

This is not a complete answer; just my theory for a framework of an answer.

As the very nature of my rant is about cutting the nonsense, I thought it would be counterproductive to polish up my rhetoric. I welcome all responses but ask that you keep them real; i.e. not party line verbiage or how you wished you believed, but stuff that would pass a lie detector test (unless of course it's funny). And please don't get hung up on my particular usages versus the spirit of what I am saying.

Gut voch,

Aaron

Tefisas Yad in the Mishkan and the Beis Hamikdash — Eruvin 85b

Tefisas Yad in the Mishkan and the Beis Hamikdash — Eruvin 85b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פה/ב

רבי יהודה אומר אם יש שם תפיסת יד של בעל הבית אינו אוסר

We already explained (above 66a):

The Rashba (Avodas HaKodesh, 4:3) writes:

When a non-Jew rents his property to another non-Jew, if the owner retains the right to remove the tenant whenever he wants, then sechiras reshus may be done from the owner - even if he has not removed the tenant yet. [There are two reasons why this is the Halacha,] because the sechiras reshus is itself a form of removal, and because [under such circumstances] the owner is the primary authority. If, however, the owner cannot remove the tenant, then the sechiras reshus must contracted with the tenant. It seems to me that if, however, the owner has some control over the property he has rented to the tenant, such as objects stored on that property, or even just the right to place objects on the property, then one may even rent the right to carry from the owner, who is then no worse than the employee or agent of the tenant.

The ruling of the Rashba is codified as accepted practice in the Shulchan Aruch (382:18,19. See the Mishna Berura there, §60-64 and §75-77). Control of an owner over property through the placement of objects is known as tefisas yad. (Literally: under the control of one’s hand).

The Yismach Moshe (Ki Sisa 189a) extrapolates from this Gemara a mystical interpretation of the purpose of the machatzis ha'shekel and its association with the Mishkan: Bnei Yisrael were each required to give a half of a shekel towards the building of the Mishkan. They gave these coins in the course of a census, individually — albeit giving the same, common sum. A census by its nature counts — identifies — individuals, each person remained an entity unto himself. However, because the coins went for the construction of the Mishkan, they were, in fact, bound together by the process. How so? By giving these coins, each person acquires a portion in the Mishkan. Each person, hence, has a tefisas yad hold in the Mishkan. Just as in terms of an eruv a tefisas yad creates a bond and a union, so too the common tefisas yad in the Mishkan bound and united the Bnei Yisrael together – and together with Hashem.

Head Covering — Eruvin 84b

Head Covering — Eruvin 84b

רש"י עירובין דף פד/ב

בכומתא וסודרא - שרגילין לתת עליו בחול כובעין ומעפורת ותשמיש נוחה והגון הוא להם למשאוי קל כזה, ואף על פי שאינו ראוי להם לכיתוף משאוי כבד, כדאמר ביציאות השבת (שבת ח, א) תשעה מזו לכתף, אבל עשרה לא הני מילי למשאוי כבד, ומיהו, לכומתא וסודרא חזו, כשבני אדם עייפין בימות החמה נוטלין כובעיהן וסודרן מראשיהן עד שיפוח הרוח בהן

Rashi writes that when people are tired in the summer, they remove their hats and their yarmulkes from their heads until the breeze cools them down.

The Bechor Shor (to Shabbos 118b), who is very meticulous when it comes to men covering their heads, writes that when a person does remove his head coverings for this purpose, he should not walk more than four amos.

Accordingly, writes Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchok (4:30), we can understand the ruling of the Beis Yosef (Orach Chaim §301), that a person may wear a hat out in a public thoroughfare on Shabbos even if it sits loosely on his head. This would seem difficult — why are we not concerned that it will blow off his head and that he might come to carry it four amos in the reshus ha'rabbim? However, according to the Bechor Shor, this is not a concern, because people are careful not to go four amos bareheaded — even though most authorities hold that covering the head is only a "trait of the pious" (מדת חסידות).

In fact, Teshuvos Shevus Yaakov (3:5; cited in Gilyonei HaShas here) proves that even in the Beis HaMikdash there was no prohibition to go bareheaded. Hence, when the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 91:3) writes that one must protest against a person who enters a Shul bareheaded, that is only a function of middas chassidus. Indeed, Teshuvos Maharshal (§72) proves that there is technically no prohibition to read the Shema and daven bareheaded (although the Taz, Orach Chaim §8, disputes this, asserting that it is prohibited because it mimics the practice of non-Jews [בחוקותיהם לא תלכו]). Therefore, if a duke or great ruler visits a Shul, and for some reason could not be convinced that Jews do not remove their head coverings in Shuls, and that their leaving them in place evinces no lack of respect — it is permitted to remove one's head covering even in the Shul.

Halachah is in Accordance with R' Yose? — Eruvin 83b

Halachah is in Accordance with R' Yose? — Eruvin 83b

תוספות עירובין דף פג/ב

ולכאורה נראה דאין הלכה כרבי יוסי כדאמרינן במי שהוציאוהו (לעיל דף מו:) דהלכה כר' יוסי מחבירו ולא מחביריו

From Teshuvos Yechaveh Da'as 4:51:

In Meseches Mezuzah (chap. 2) there is a dispute between the Sages and R' Yose concerning the placement of a mezuzah in the case of a portico that cannot be accessed from outside. One can only enter it from within a house. The Sages assert that the mezuzah is placed on the right side when entering from the portico into the house, while R' Yose maintains that the mezuzah is placed on the right side when exiting from the house into the portico.

Now, above (46b; see Tosafos to Ta'anis 28a) we learned that the law is in accordance with R' Yose even when he disagrees with several of his colleagues, because his logic was unassailable (הלכה כרבי יוסי אף מחבריו, שרבי יוסי נימוקו עמו). However, Tosafos here (d.h. Shivas), and the Rosh (Sukkah 1:31) in the name of the Geonim and the Ramban write that the proper version reads that the law is only in accordance with R' Yose when he disagrees with a single colleague, not with many of them. The Yad Malachi (§230) writes that this version of the principle is the correct one.

(Interestingly, however, Teshuvos Yechaveh Da'as does not feel bound to take the description of the dispute as described in Meseches Mezuzah as authoritative, as many authorities have written that the Mesechtos Ketanos do not contain Baraisos that underwent the editing of R' Chiya and R' Oshiya, and are therefore replete with errors.)

A Piece I Wrote for the RKYHS Weekly Newsletter

Extracurricular Talmud Enrichment

Talmidim of the Rae Kushner Yeshiva High School have embarked on a new journey of discovery in the "Sea of the Talmud." At the request of Yehuda Popack and Eitan Fine in my 11-12^th grade shiur, and Yoni Rozenberg in my 9-10^th grade shiur, we have just begun to implement an optional Enrichment. B'ezrat Hashem, we will be pursuing Talmudic logic through problems from the sefer Mishmeret Chaim. This sefer is based on the famous וואס איז דער חילוק – What is the Distinction series of Rabbi Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg shlita, the Rosh HaYeshiva of Yeshivat Torah Ore in Yerushalayim.

For many years, every Thursday evening Rabbi Scheinberg presents his students with a logical conundrum: Two seemingly contradictory laws or principles. The students are then given the opportunity to come up with a resolution.

For example, one of the questions is: When we affix mezuzot to the doors of a house, we recite the same berachah no matter how many mezuzot we are affixing – a berachah that is phrased in the singular: “Who has commanded us to affix a mezuzah.”

On the other hand, when we bring new vessels to a mikveh, the text of the berachah depends on how many vessels we intend to immerse: If there is only one vessel to be immersed, the berachah is: “Who has commanded us to immerse a vessel,” but if there are two or more vessels to be immersed, the berachah changes to: “Who has commanded us to immerse vessels.” וואס איז דער חילוק – why in the case of mezuzah is there no variation in the text, while in the case of tevilat kelim there is variation?

At the end of last week, we posed a question that relates to the topic that we are currently studying in Mesechet Sukkah. The rule we just learned is that העוסק במצוה פטור ממצוה – a person who is involved at the moment in one mitzvah is exempt from involving himself in another mitzvah. Why, then, is the law that a person who is in the middle of Keriat Shema must interrupt his Shema so as to answer to Kaddish or Kedushah? Keriat Shema is a mitzvah and so is Kaddish. וואס איז דער חילוק – why does the normal principle of a person who is involved at the moment in one mitzvah is exempt from involving himself in another mitzvah not apply in this case?

Aryeh Ackerman, one of the students in the 11-12^th grade shiur, came up with a resolution (one of those proposed by Rabbi Scheinberg himself!) almost immediately. His response was based on a law he had learned in his last year's Talmud class with Rabbi Levy: The law is that one may interrupt one's Keriat Shema to greet a human being whom one fears or of whom one is in awe, such as a king. If that is the case, it is a קל וחומר – certainly the case that one may interrupt one's Keriat Shema in order to”greet” Hashem via Kaddish or Kedushah, as we are certainly in fear and in awe of the King of Kings! (The same response was given later and separately by Yehoshua Bloom.)

We hope this initiative continues to prove successful, and that other students will join in the quest to resolve these challenging problems. B'ezrat Hashem, we will be able to share some of the problems — and some of our students' chiddushim in resolving these problems — with you on these pages.

Minors and Eruvei Techumin — Eruvin 82a

Minors and Eruvei Techumin — Eruvin 82a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פב/א

אמר רב אסי קטן בן שש יוצא בעירוב אמו

The Beis Yosef (Orach Chaim, end of §343) writes in the name of the Rashba and the Ran that one may deliberately feed a minor something that is prohibited by rabbinic decree — even if the child has reached the age of chinuch. However, the Rashba stipulates that his opinion should be taken as theoretical, not practical (להלכה ולא למעשה), and the Rambam rules explicitly that a child may not be fed a rabbinically prohibited substance. Moreover, adds the Rambam, it is forbidden to allow the child to habitually violate rabbinic prohibitions on Shabbos and Yom Tov ((איסור שבות.

The Beis HaLevi (3:55) notes that our Gemara seems to contradict the position taken by the Rashba and the Ran: Here we see that a child — even one that is not yet at the age of chinuch — must be a part of an eruv techumin in order that it be permitted to bring him beyond the techum. But according the Rashba and the Ran, since techum is a rabbinic prohibition, one should be permitted to remove the child beyond the techum even without his being a part of an eruv techumin, and even deliberately!?

The Beis HaLevi resolves the apparent contradiction of the basis of Teshuvos HaRashba §92, in which the Rashba writes explicitly that the dispensation to deliberately feed a minor something that is prohibited by rabbinic decree is only effective where the food in question (or the rabbinically prohibited activity in question) meets a need of the child himself. But when the child has no need for the food or activity, it remains forbidden to engage him in that food or activity. Evidently our Gemara concerns a case in which the extension of the techum is a need of the adult, not of the child. That is why the child must be a participant in the eruv techumin.

Two He'aros from Yerushalmi Pe'ah 5a

1. The Yerushalmi asks under what circumstances can Avodah Zarah and Gilui Arayos be considered "kalos" (as opposed to "chamuros"), and it answers, "when he did not do Teshuvah but died with afflictions." From here we see yisurin are mechaper even without Teshuvah.

2. The Yerushalmi says that in the case of a majority of mitzvos, the deceased inherits Gan Eden, while in the case of a majority of aveiros the deceased inherits Gehinom. This seems to indicate that mitzvos and aveiros cancel each other out, not like the Gemara in Sotah 21. Tzarich iyun.

Pachim Ketanim

משך חכמה על בראשית פרק לב פסוק כד

ויעבר את אשר לו - הנה בפ' מצורע (יד, לה) כתוב אשר לו הבית ודרשו (ערכין טז) שאינו משאיל כליו לאחרים כן כאן שכל הכלים היה משאילן לאחרים שאף שהוא חדש טומאת עו"ג כמו שאמר (בראשית לה ב) והחליפו שמלותיכם והטהרו (רמב"ם פ"ו מהל' אבות הטומאה) יכול היה להשאילן ולטובלן אבל כלי חרס לא היה יכול להשאילן שאין להן טהרה במקוה אלא שבירה (שבת פד סע"א) לכן היו מיוחדין לו לבדו שלא יכנסו בבית שיש בו עו"ג ולכן אמרו שנשתייר על פכים קטנים (רש"י. חולין צא סע"א) וזה כלי חרס ודו"ק

R' Henoch Moshe Levin noted that the Meshech Chochmo here seems difficult: The phrase here seems to refer to the property Yaakov had already taken, not what he left behind.

Lulei divrei haM"C I would say the opposite: Since there was already a gezeirah on Tumas Akum, it would follow that they were already gozeir that Akum are metamei like zavin. If so, the question is why Yaakov would bother to go back for a forgotten keli - should he not have to suspect that is was moved by an Akum, and therefore tamei through tumas heseit?

It is for this reason that Chazal concluded that he went back for pachim ketanim. This is in line with one of the well known answers (although I forget off hand who gav it) on the famous question (see Tosafos et al to Shabbos 21b) as to why the Chasmona'im did not suspect that the pach shemen had been moved by Akum: That the pach had a very narrow mouth, in which a finger could not be inserted, and the law is that any keli in which a finger cannot be inserted is not matamei b'heseit. That is what Chazal stress: pachim ketanim!

All Changes are Extrinsic — Eruvin 81b

All Changes are Extrinsic — Eruvin 81b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פא/ב

שזכין לאדם שלא בפניו ואין חבין לאדם שלא בפניו

The Rambam, Introduction §18 to Part II of Moreh Nevuchim writes (Friedlander translation): "Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that of actuality, is caused to do so by some external agent: because if that agent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented the transition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, but always in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thing itself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certain time that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removed the obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of the transition from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situated within the body]. Note this."

It is on the basis of this principle that the Rogatchover (Tzofnas Pa'anei'ach, Mahadura Tinyana 11b) explains the concept of zechiah — specifically, why it must be done with another party, through whom the original owner bestows the ownership of an item upon a third party: A person cannot effect the change on his own, as all change must be effected by an outside agent.

According to the Rogatchover, this principle explains many Halachic issues. For example, the reason why a person cannot testify against himself (see Kesubos 23b) is because testimony effects change, and all change must be extrinsic (Teshuvos Tzofnas Pa'anei'ach [Dvinsk] 1:3).

This is also the reason why a transfer of ownership in which the owner is compelled to give up ownership without compensation is invalid, while the same transaction with compensation is valid (see Bava Basra 48b): When compensation is provided there is an extrinsic agent of change; when it is not provided there is none (Tzofnas Pa'anei'ach, Mahadura Tinyana p. 60; seee more examples in Mefa'anei'ach Tzefunos 14:4).

A Lechi or Korah from an Asheirah — Eruvin 80a

A Lechi or Korah from an Asheirah — Eruvin 80a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף פ/ב

אתמר רב חייא בר אשי אמר עושין לחי אשירה ורבי שמעון בן לקיש אמר עושין קורה אשירה מאן דאמר קורה כל שכן לחי ומאן דאמר לחי אבל קורה לא כתותי מכתת שיעוריה

The Rambam (Hil. Shabbos 17:12-13) rules that a lechi may be made from a forbidden asheirah tree, but not a korah. The Ra'avad (ad loc.) asks why there is a difference: Asheirah wood cannot serve as a korah, because a korah needs to possess a minimum measurement (of a tefach). Since asheirah wood is כתותי מכתת שיעוריה — i.e. since it must be burnt, it is considered as if already burnt, and therefore is treated as ashes — it cannot meet the required measurement of a tefach. However, a lechi also needs to possess a minimum measurement — a height of ten tefachim. If so, asks the Ra'avad, why is a lechi of asheirah acceptable?

R' Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk (ad loc.) addresses the question. He explains that the Rambam's opinion is that the required measurement of ten tefachim of height does not pertain to the walls of a reshus ha'yachid, but to the enclosed area — viz., an area that is ten tefachim in height must be surrounded by walls. In theory, once an area that is ten tefachim high is enclosed by walls, it is a reshus ha'yachid regardless of whether the walls that enclose it are ten tefachim high or not.

A lechi (although not necessarily a korah) functions like a fourth wall of a mavoi. Hence, it has the same parameters of a wall. Thus, so long as it "encloses" a height of ten tefachim, it creates the necessary condition for the enclosed area to be considered a reshus ha'yachid. It does not matter that as a lechi of asheirah the lechi itself does not posses the minimum measurement. This is distinct from a korah, in which case the Rabbis required that the korah itself possess the minimum measurement of a tefach.

An Eved and Eruvei Techumin — Eruvin 79b

An Eved and Eruvei Techumin — Eruvin 79b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עט/ב

ואומר הרי זו לכל בני מבוי ומזכה להן על ידי בנו ובתו הגדולים ועל ידי עבדו ושפחתו העברים ועל ידי אשתו אבל אינו מזכה לא על ידי בנו ובתו הקטנים ולא על ידי עבדו ושפחתו הכנענים מפני שידן כידו

In a fascinating comparison, the Rogatchover (Tzofnas Pa'anei'ach, Mahadura Tinyana 33d) contrasts the law that Canaanite slaves are not capable of contracting eruvin with the law (Rambam, Hil. Klei Mikdash 1:13) that broken klei shareis (holy vessels used in the Beis HaMikdash) that were melted and forged again remain holy.

In the introduction to Moreh Nevuchim (volume two, fourth introduction), the Givas HaMoreh distinguishes between sudden changes and gradual changes. The Rogatchover expands on this distinction, and asserts that abrupt changes indicate a change into a new entity, while gradual changes indicate that the entity retains at least some degree of its previous status.

The Rogatchover explains that this distinction underlies the difference between a convert and a slave in terms of the fulfillment of the mitzvah of pru u'revu. A ger's conversion is done with his intent and consent, while a slave's release is not done with his intent and consent. Thus, a ger's change in status is gradual while an eved's is abrupt. Hence, the children that a ger had before he converted count towards the mitzvah, while the children that an eved had before he was released do not count towards the mitzvah.

Similarly, the melting and forging of the broken klei shareis is gradual, and therefore the kli shareis retains its holiness. On the other hand, upon his release, the eved becomes a completely new entity. Extrapolating backwards, the Rogatchover concludes that an eved prior to his release has no legal identity. His capacity to eat from his master's korban pesach, or from the master's terumah if the master is a Kohen, is an extension of the master's status, not a function of his own.

A ramification of his lack of legal identity is that an eved does not need to have his own two meals when he participates in an eruv techumin with his master. In this respect, he is like a child, who is a part of his mother's eruv (below 82a).

Reshus HaYachid Mounds — Eruvin 78a

Reshus HaYachid Mounds — Eruvin 78a

תוספות עירובין דף עח/א

ד"ה אלא מאי אית לך למימר דמנח עליה מידי ומשתמש:

ולא קאי האי טעמא אלא היכא דאין הבור רחב ד' מבפנים אלא ע"י צירוף חוליא והחוליא גבוה עשרה מבחוץ לרה"ר דאע"ג דתוכו לאו רה"י הוא על גביו רה"י משום דאי בעי מנח עליה מידי ומשתמש

The Tosafos state that the Gemara only needs to resort to the possibility of placing something across the mouth of a hollow mound in a case in which the inner dimensions of the mound do not suffice to constitute a reshus ha'yachid (viz. the areas if the mound is less than 4x4 tefachim) — while the outside dimensions are sufficient. Since there exists the possibility of placing something, such as a plank, across the mouth of a mound, the top of the mound — which is surrounded by ten-tefach walls and is itself 4x4 — is a reshus ha'yachid.

R' Chaim Soloveitchik of Brisk (Hil. Shabbos 14:1) finds this approach difficult: If the top of this mound is a reshus ha'yachid, why is the inside of the mound not also considered a reshus ha'yachid on the basis of the principle of חורי רה"י כרה"י — the holes [extending] from a private domain are like a private domain (see Shabbos 7b)?

In order to answer this question, he distinguishes between two types of walls: Walls that create a reshus ha'yachid within their confines, vs. walls that create a reshus ha'yachid above their confines (through the principle of gud asek mechitzta [literally: extend the walls up]). When walls encompass an area that is itself of sufficient dimensions to be a reshus ha'yachid, then the holes coming off that area s are also considered part of that reshus ha'yachid (even though in themselves the holes do not posses those dimensions). However, where the walls only create a reshus ha'yachid when their thickness is included — and therefore only create that reshus across their top (by means of the virtual plank) — the holes in the walls are separate from the area in which not a part of a reshus hayachid and therefore are not subject to the principle that the holes [extending] from a private domain are like a private domain.

Mailboxes Etc. — Eruvin 77a

Mailboxes Etc. — Eruvin 77a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עז/א

דכי אתא רב דימי אמר רבי יוחנן מקום שאין בו ארבעה על ארבעה מותר לבני רשות הרבים ולבני רשות היחיד לכתף עליו ובלבד שלא יחליפו

A space that is smaller in area than four by four tefachim (but more than three tefachim above the ground) is a makom patur. This is also the case when a hole in a wall abuts a reshus ha'rabbim. It is not included in the reshus ha'rabbim, and if it is less that four by four it is a makom patur.

It is permissible to remove or bring objects from anything defined as a makom patur to a reshus ha'yachid or a reshus ha'rabbim or vice versa. One is not allowed, however, to remove an object from a reshus ha'yachid, bring it into a makom patur, and then transfer it through the makom patur to a reshus ha'rabbim or vice versa. If one stands in a reshus ha'yachid and removes, brings, extends or throws an object into a reshus ha'rabbim via a makom patur or vice versa, one transgresses a Torah prohibition. Similarly, one may not position oneself in a makom patur in order to take objects from an individual in a reshus ha'rabbim and give them to a third party in a reshus ha'yachid or vice versa. Even if the makom patur is located between two domains between which it is only rabbinically forbidden to transfer objects, such as two yards that have not joined in a common eruv, one may not stand in that makom patur and transport objects from yard to yard (if those objects originated or will terminate in one of the houses fronting on the respective yards).

On the basis of our Gemara, the Semag (Lavin§65) adds that it is also forbidden (by Rabbinic decree) for a person in the reshus ha'rabbim (or, by rabbinic decree, a carmelis) to place an object in a makom patur for another person on the other side to then take it into the reshus ha'yachid. The Sages forbade this case lest one of the people would come to perform all the steps himself, thus resulting in a Torah prohibition (see Shulchan Aruch,Orach Chaim 372:6).

It would thus seem forbidden to take in mail that was left by the mailman in a mailbox that is a makom patur between a reshus ha'rabbim or carmelis and a makom patur. However, Teshuvos B'Tzel HaChochmah (3:17) suggests that the Semag's prohibition only applies in a case involving two Jews. If the mailman is not Jewish, the case is not subject to the Sages' decree, and it would be permitted for the Jew to bring his mail in from the mailbox.

Eilu va'Eilu Update

My response to the question posed below:

No, it does not obligate us to believe the statements are true in the literal sense. R' Yisroel Salanter states explicitly that incorrect statements are also Torah. Eilu va'eilu instructs us that the rejected position is also worthy of study and consideration.

KT,

YGB

******* wrote:

What I meant was doesn't the concept of

"eilu v'eilu" *obligate* us to believe that

all statements of Chazal are true? And if so,

how then can one "choose" one statement

over another in the case of a machlokes

over a matter of opinion?

A House is Considered as if it is Filled — Eruvin 76b

A House is Considered as if it is Filled — Eruvin 76b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עו/ב

בעא מיניה רבי אבא מרב נחמן לול הפתוח מן בית לעלייה צריך סולם קבוע להתירו או אין צריך סולם קבוע להתירו כי אמרינן ביתא כמאן דמלי דמי הני מילי מן הצד אבל באמצע לא או דילמא לא שנא אמר ליה אינו צריך סבור מינה סולם קבוע הוא דאינו צריך הא סולם עראי צריך איתמר אמר רב יוסף בר מניומי אמר רב נחמן אחד סולם קבוע ואחד סולם עראי אינו צריך

The case here is one of a second floor apartment built atop a first floor apartment. The apartments belong to different people, but there is an opening between the two — a kind of trapdoor in the ceiling of the lower apartment that is the floor of the upper apartment. The Gemara invokes the principle of ביתא כמאן דמלי דמי — a house is considered as if it is filled, and rules that it is not necessary to have a ladder in place in order to consider the two apartments as accessible to each other in order for them to participate in a joint eruv.

R' Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, Orach Chaim 1:139, end of anaf 2) posits that the principle that a house is considered as if it is filled— only applies when the "house" is enclosed by both walls and a roof. As evidence of this, he cites Rashi to Shabbos 97a, who writes that the reason that a house is considered as if it is filled is because the house is dark and its air is thick. Thus, it is only in the case of a closed house that no ladder is necessary, because only then does the principle of a house is considered as if it is filled allow us to treat the case as one in which there is access to the upper apartment by the virtual climbing of the virtual ladder fashioned from the virtual objects that "fill" the house.

Accordingly, writes Reb Moshe, a novel ruling would apply to a case in which the second floor apartment was built over a first floor that consisted of pillars, but no walls. In this case, the virtual ladder is non-existent, since the principle of a house is considered as if it is filled is not applicable. Accordingly, in this case, a permanent ladder providing real access must be in place for the two owners to participate in a joint eruv.

Loud — Eruvin 75b

Loud — Eruvin 75b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עה/ב

סתם נכרי אי איתא דאוגר מיפעא פעי

The Gemara here tells us that if a non-Jew had rented a property, he would have made it known loudly — he would have bellowed, or shouted.

The Rambam (Shemoneh Perakim; based on Kiddushin 71b — cf. Rashi ad loc.) writes that the extent to which a person maintains silence is in direction proportion to the distinction of his lineage (יחוס).

The Maharal (Nesivos Olam vol. 2, Nesiv HaShesikah) finds this difficult — what does silence have to do with lineage?

He suggests an interpretation based on our Gemara (see also Chullin 113b): Since we see that non-Jews — who obviously do not possess Jewish lineage — bellow and shout (and are generally loud), it follows that the less talkative and more soft-spoken a person, the more distinguished his lineage. He explains that this is because a tendency to silence is indicative of צניעות — modesty. The word tzeni'us itself is rooted in the shoresh צנע, which means to conceal. And, as the Maharal explains elsewhere (Nesiv HaTzeni'us), people who conduct themselves with tzeni'us merit having holy children. The parents' tendency to silence leads to children who tend to silence, and the children's tendency to silence indicates that the parents tended to silence: "Therefore, curtailing one's speech — which is tzeni'us — indicates lineage. For this is the foundation of lineage, to be the progeny of tzenu'im. Hence, this person is also modest in his speech, and does not reveal matters…"

Eruv and Mezuzah — Eruvin 74b

Eruv and Mezuzah — Eruvin 74b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עד/ב

ואיבות בר איהי סבר מקום פיתא גרים ושמואל לטעמיה דאמר מקום לינה גרים

The Gemara cites the dispute as to the determination of a person's primary "place" for the purposes of participation in an eruv: Is the person's place to eat primary, or his place to sleep primary.

Teshuvos BeTzel HaChochmah (3:84) asserts that this definition is applicable to the laws of mezuzah as well: Only rooms that can be classified as a place for eating or a place for sleeping (or a room that serves as a passageway into one of these rooms) need to have a mezuzah. Hence, rules the BeTzel HaChochmah, the doors of elevators are exempt from mezuzos: the elevators are not places of eating or sleeping (nor can they be liable to have a mezuzah as a room leading into one of these rooms, as the impermanence of the elevator cabin's location precludes its doors from being considered a passageway).

However, Teshuvos Avnei Nezer (in several responsa — see, for example, Yoreh Deah §382) suggests that the parameters of mezuzah are not comparable to the parameters of eruvin. Hence, a room used by a woman to apply cosmetics and to beautify her self is liable to have a mezuzah, even though she never sleeps nor eats there. It must be, asserts the Avnei Nezer, that it is only because eruvin are a Rabbinic enactment that a more lenient standard is applied here and that a place need not be taken into account unless it serves for eating or sleeping.

Well, It's Almost Chanukah… Where Does a Yeshivah Bachur Light Candles?

Well, It's Almost Chanukah… Where Does a Yeshivah Bachur Light Candles?

— Eruvin 73a

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עג/א

בעא מיניה רב חייא בר אבין מרב ששת בני בי רב דאכלי נהמא בבאגא ואתו ובייתי בבי רב כי משחינן להו תחומא מבי רב משחינן להו או מבאגא משחינן להו אמר ליה משחינן מבי רב

The Gemara here relates a question that R' Chiya bar Avin asked R' Sheishes: Talmidim in a yeshivah that eat their meals in an inn in a valley but sleep in the yeshivah, from where are their 2000 amos of Techum Shabbos measured? Rav Sheishes responded that the Techum is measured from the yeshivah — i.e., from the place in which they sleep (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 409:7). The Gemara subsequently explains that this is because, given the possibility, they would prefer to eat in the yeshivah.

The Gemara here equates eruvei chatzeiros with eruvei techumin, and on this basis the Magen Avraham (370:5) rules that a shepherd who eats his meals in town, but sleeps out in the field, does not have to be included in the town's eruvei chatzeiros — since his primary place is in the field (see Pri Megadim and Beur Halachah ad loc.).

Teshuvos Minchas Yitzchak (7:48; citing Moadim U'Zemanim 6:88) notes that the Taz (677:2) equates the parameters of eruvei chatzeiros and Chanukah. Hence, it is preferable for talmidim in a yeshivah to light the Chanukah candles in their dormitories, rather than in the dining room.

The Minchas Yitzchak does qualify his ruling: If the talmidim sleep at home and eat in the yeshivah, it cannot be said that, given the opportunity, they would prefer to eat at home — since going home might lead to Bittul Torah! Therefore, they should arrange to eat at home during Chanukah, so that they definitely may light candles there. However, if this might indeed lead to Bittul Torah, they should in fact light in the yeshivah's dining room (see also Teshuvos Mishneh Halachos 11:538).

Pras vs. Sachar — Eruvin 72b

Pras vs. Sachar — Eruvin 72b

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף עב/ב

רב יהודה אמר רב במקבלי פרס שנו

In Pirkei Avos (1:3), Antigonus of Socho tells us that we should not serve Hashem as slaves who toil in order to receive a פרס, but like slaves who serve Hashem with no ulterior motivation.

From this passage in our Gemara and subsequently 73a it seems that pras connotes sustenance in this world. Indeed, Rashi to Avos (loc. cit.) explains that the reason one should not serve Hashem in order to receive a pras is because there is no reward in this world for mitzvos (דשכר מצוה בהאי עלמא ליכא).

Thus, writes R' Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Divrei Sofrim §4), Antigonus actually meant to

admonish his students not to seek reward for their mitzvos in this world.

Moreover, states Reb Tzadok, even when a person's intent is to seek reward in the World to Come, if his intent is only to attain a "spot" in, and the "benefits" of the World to Come, then that too falls into the category of seeking to receive a pras. Rather, one's intent should be to merit enjoying the radiance of the Shechinah — which is the true sachar of the World to Come. When that is the intent of one's performance of a mitzvah, the mitzvah brings one to Teshuvah, to Ahavas Hashem and to Dveykus.

Based on this dichotomy between pras and sachar, Reb Tzadok explains several difficult Ma'amarei Chazal — some that indicate that Gedolei HaDoros would serve Hashem with the intent to receive sachar, and some that encourage Avodas Hashem with the intent to receive sachar. For example, earlier in the mesechta (28b) we saw that when he was feeling weak, R' Zeira would sit outside the Beis Medrash to rise before the rabbis entering and exiting in order "to receive a reward [sachar]." It is only the quest of pras that is not proper. The quest for sachar — for Dveykus — is, in fact, the primary purpose of mitzvos, and to seek that sachar is to do a mitzvah lishmah.