Hillel and Ezra - Shabbos 153b

הלל ועזרא

Hillel and Ezra

Shabbos 153b

The Gemara here cites the dispute between R’ Yehoshua and R’ Eliezer as to whether the episode in which Beis Shammai overwhelmed Beis Hillel and issued eighteen new decrees was a good thing or a bad thing (see the description of the even earlier in the mesechta, 17b).

Hillel, the first of the Sages of the Mishnah, was eulogized as a student of Ezra HaSofer (Sanhedrin 11a). Indeed, both Sages ascended from Bavel to Eretz Yisrael and renewed interest and involvement in Torah.

R’ Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Takanas HaShavin #5) notes that it would seem that they were of very different bents. Ezra and the Anshei Knesses HaGedolah were very much involved in instituting seyagim and takkanos - boundary prohibitions surrounding Torah law, and enactments meant to promote greater observance (see the beginning of Pirkei Avos), while Hillel and his students opposed the institution of newer and greater strictures in Halachah (see Tosafos to 14b d.h. V’Ilu and here d.h. Bo Bayom. This was in line with Hillel’s general trend towards leniency. How, then was Hillel a student of Ezra?

Reb Tzadok resolves the difficulty. He notes that, clearly, Hillel was not literally a student of Ezra, who lived many years before him. Rather, he followed in Ezra’s footsteps in that he was humble and pious (as the Gemara in Sanhedrin frames the eulogy: הי עניו הי חסיד ). However, in the generation of Ezra, humility and piety required more seyagim and takkanos. This was essential for the success and maintenance of that generation’s teshuvah, which was not complete. Since they did not achieve full teshuvah, there prior sins were not reversed, and new enactments had to be introduced in order to prevent backsliding.

In Hillel’s time, however, the great love he displayed towards others (see Pirkei Avos 1:12) influenced them to turn with love towards Hashem. Teshuvah done out of love is complete teshivah. In such circumstances, Chazal tell us that the sinner’s pasts transgressions metamorphose and become merits. Hence, those sins would not lead to backsliding - as they themselves have been changed into mitzvos. Therefore, new enactments and boundaries were not necessary.

The Wheel of Poverty - Shabbos 151b

הגלגל החוזר

The Wheel of Poverty

Shabbos 151b

The Gemara relates that R’ Chiya told his wife that if and when a poor person comes to their door, she should immediately bring him bread to eat — even before they had a chance to make requests. R’ Chiya explained to her that in reward for her diligence in this matter, other people would immediately bring their children bread, when the children became impoverished. R’ Chiya’s wife was astonished, and she responded to here husband: “Are you cursing me?” To which R’ Chiya replied that the reality is that poverty is like a wheel that rolls around the world, and would therefore inevitably affect their descendants at some time (see Yevamos 63a for something about the state of the relationship of R’ Chiya and his wife).

On the basis of this discussion, the Vilna Gaon (see Pninim MeShulchan HaGra to Ki Sisa 30:12) explained the trop (cantillation) on the word ונתנו — and they shall give — in the phrase: כִּי תִשָּׂא אֶת־רֹאשׁ
בְּנֵֽי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לִפְקֻֽדֵיהֶם וְנָתְנוּ אִישׁ כֹּפֶר נַפְשׁוֹ לַֽיהוָֹה בִּפְקֹד אֹתָם — If you uplift the heads of the Jews according to their count, and they shall give, each person, the redemption of his soul to Hashem when they are counted. The trop is a kadma v’azla.

This trop is placed specifically on ונתנו , as this word is a palindrome - a word that reads the same forwards and backwards. This word comes to indicate that sometimes the giver or his children will be compelled to accept charity from the person to whom they once gave tzedakah themselves.

The allusion in the trop is in the literal meanings of kadma v’azla — “goes in early and then goes forth.” Thus, R’ Chiya told his wife something along these lines: “Give the poor person the bread as soon as possible, so that the merit will go forth and provide for your children.”

[See Baal HaTurim ad loc. who also notes the palindrome, but explains that it comes to teach us that if a person gives to tzedakah, he will receive the money back in some manner, and thus, in the final analysis, he does not suffer financially from giving itzedakah.

Thinking About Weekday Matters on Shabbos -

הרהור בעניני חול בשבת

Thinking About Weekday Matters on Shabbos

Shabbos 150b

Although the Gemara (150a) rules that it is permitted to think of weekday matters on Shabbos, it subsequently (150b) cites the episode of a certain very pious individual who found himself thinking of his weekday matters on Shabbos and felt that he had violated the sanctity of Shabbos by doing so.

Reb Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin (Yisrael Kedoshim #8) writes that when we thank Hashem in the Minchah of Shabbos for providing us with the potential to achieve a מנוחת אמת ואמונה — a rest of truth and belief — we are referring to our potential to attain the level of that very pious individual. For the ideal Menuchas Shabbos in which even in the depth of our hearts we regard all weekday matters as having been completed and no longer requiring our attention. It does not suffice for us to do the minimum, to refrain from forbidden activities yet at the same time allow our hearts to continue being distracted by our commerce and craft.

Only such a state can rightly be termed a Menuchas Emes, for truth is that which penetrates to our greatest depths and remains consistent. A “truth” that only “holds true” on a superificial level (refraining from expressing concern over weekday matters, yet at the same time considering, these matters in our mind) cannot be called “true.” Such superficial truth might fool other people, but not Hashem, concerning whom it is said שחותמו אמת — his seal is truth.

Thus, while refraining from mundane conversation is a technical fulfillment of the command to desist from expressing oneself in weekday matters, it is not a Menuchah Sheleimah (a truly complete, befiting rest).

Hence, concludes Reb Tzadok, those who are in awe of G-d because they are cognizant of Hashem’s knowledge of that which is concealed deep in one’s heart are extremely meticulous and vigilant in barring any weekday thoughts from their minds.

Turning to False Gods - Shabbos 149a

פניה לאלילים

Turning to False Gods

Shabbos 149a

The Gemara here states that one may not gaze at images even on a weekday, as this is a violation of the Torah’s prohibition (Vayikra 19:4): אל תפנו אל האלילים — Do not turn to false gods. The Gemara explains that gazing at images is subsumed under this prohibition because the phrase may be read: אל תפנו אל מדעתכם — Do not turn to that which you create from your own thoughts.

Ramban (to Vayikra loc. cit.) explains the prohibition further, and states that it warns us not to belief that other deities can provide us with any benefit, nor to believe predictions that the prophets of these deities foretell. Rather, you must realize that the future is dictated by Hashem alome, and the other gods and all that is attributed to them must be null and void in your eyes. It is in this context, continues Ramban, that the Gemara asks us to avoid gazing at representations of other deities, as a person should avoid focusing his attention on any deity other than Hashem.

In the same vein, Shem MiShmuel (Parashas Veyeileich, 5672) writes that the statement (Devarim 31:18): וְאָנֹכִי הַסְתֵּר אַסְתִּיר פָּנַי בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא עַל כָּל הָרָעָה אֲשֶׁר עָשָׂה כִּי פָנָה אֶל אֱלֹהִים אֲחֵרִים — And I will surely conceal My countenance on that day on account of all the evil that he did, for he turned to other gods — does not refer to pantheistic or pagan worhsip. Rather, it refers to a person who did not sanctify himself sufficiently — to a person who was not meticulous in refraining from gazing at the images of other deities. In this manner Shem MeShmuel resolves the difficulty presented by the pesukim in Parashas Vayeileich: If the Jews have already done teshuvah, as indicated by the previous pesukim, why does Hashem continuee to conceal himself?

The answer is that they did teshuvah on the major sins, and that suffices to save them from perishing in Galus, but they did not turn away from the images of the countenances of other gods. Hence, measure for measure, Hashem conceals His countenance from them.

Shem MeShmuel concludes: וזה לימוד גדול לאדם לידע שבימי התשובה העיקר לקבל על עצמו להיות מקדש עצמו במותר לו מהיום והלאה וידאב לבו על העבר ולא תהי' די לו הקבלה על גופי המצוות, וישכיל וידע עד היכן הדברים מגיעים — And this is a great lesson, to know that in the days of teshuvah, the main thing is to accept upon oneself to refrain even from that which is [technically] permitted [such as gazing at images] from today onwards, and his heart should regret the past. For it does not suffice to accept resolutions on the mitzvos themselves. And a person should consider and know to what extent these matters [of teshuvah] reach.

Terms of Borrowing Objects and Terms of Borrowing Money - Shabbos 148a

זמן שאלה וזמן הלואה

Terms of Borrowing Objects and Terms of Borrowing Money

Shabbos 148a

The Mishnah states that a person may borrow jugs of wine or oil from his friend on Shabbos, so long as the term he uses to describe the transaction is the case-specific term for borrowing objects ( שאלה — lit., request) and not the term generally used to describe the borrowing of money ( הלואה — lit., loan). Rashi explains that this is because a loan is generally for thirty days (see Makkos 3b), which is a longer period of time than the period of time of a normal request. We are therefore concerned that the person who is lending the jug will want to record this unusual transaction, and may come to write on Shabbos.

Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafos rejects Rashi’s explanation. He notes that the Gemara (Menachos 44a) rules that a talis that one borrows for up to thirty days is defined as a טלית שאולה — a talis on request — is therefore exempt from tzitzis; and that a house (outside the Land of Israel) that one rents or otherwise uses has the status of a request for thirty days and is therefore exempt from mezuzah. Rabbeinu Tam explains that the exemption is clearly because everyone knows that an object or house may be the subject of a request for up to thirty days. The obligation to tie tzitzis or to fix a mezuzah after the thirty days is because the arrangement no longer looks like a request, but like an acquisition. Tosafos go on to record Ri’s explanation of our Mishnah’s ruling, which differs from Rashi.

Ramban, (to Makkos loc. cit.) however, rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s proof. He notes that, clearly, [even according to Rabbeinu Tam] the distinction between within the thirty days and after the thirty days is only in the eyes of the beholder ( מראית העין ), as a request, and even a loan, may be contracted for a longer period. It is only because people begin to perceive the tallis or house as the borrower’s or the renter’s that Chazal imposed the obligation of tzitzis or mezuzah respectively. But this has everthing to do with perception, and nothing to do with the terms of the transaction. It is entirely possible that although a loan may not be demanded back by the lender before thirty days have elpased, a request may be demanded back by its owner well within those thirty days. It is only after thirty days have elapsed, however, that people begin to regard the ownership of the object or the house as having shifted to the borrower.